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ABSTRACT
The dissertation consists of two essays. The first considers product entry as a channel for business
cycle propagation. Net product entry is procyclical, which amplifies fluctuations in consumer
welfare over the cycle if consumers have love for variety. Using barcode-level data covering grocery
expenditures in 26 major cities, I establish that differences in city-level product entry are largely
uncorrelated with local economic conditions. I provide evidence that city-level changes in product
variety over the business cycle are driven instead by multi-city retailers who introduce new products
simultaneously in all cities in which they operate. This suggests that product introduction by multi-
city retailers can propagate business cycle shocks. To quantify the impact of this mechanism, I
develop a quantitative model of retailer product choice that relates the welfare gains from product
entry in each city to demand growth in every other city. The model implies that the contribution
of other cities’ business cycle shocks to each city’s price level is proportional to the share of other
cities in retailer revenue. Since the share of outside cities in retailer revenue is 63 percent in the
average city, the impact of other cities’ shocks on product entry is substantial. The presence of
multi-city retailers makes net product entry more correlated across cities than they would be if
retailers operated in only one city. In a counterfactual in which retailers do operate in only one
city, the variation in gains from new product entry across cities would be 47 percent higher than
in the baseline.
The second essay focuses on the entry behavior of new exporting firms. New exporters
take a few years to catch up to the average total sales of all exporters. Using Colombian
export data from 2007-2012, I show that the slow catchup of new exporters is the result of
low market participation and sequential market entry (the extensive margin), rather than
xii
low sales in individual foreign markets (the intensive margin). Motivated by my empirical
findings, I develop a quantitative model in which firms enter markets sequentially, in order
of decreasing profitability. I use this model to calculate the benefit from a policy designed to
reduce bilateral entry costs and show that as the result of fixed costs that depend on export
experience, trade promotion in one market may provide significant increases in exports to
markets not targeted by the policy.
xiii
Chapter I: Gains from Product
Variety and the Local Business Cycle
1 Introduction
The Great Recession in the United States demonstrated that aggregate business cycle mea-
sures can mask substantial differences in real household consumption and income across ge-
ographic regions. If households move in response to differences in local economic conditions,
variation in productivity and employment across regions should be short-lived. Instead, out-
put in some metropolitan areas remained depressed for years after the aggregate recovery,
while other cities recovered quickly. Recent work has shown that shocks to local labor and
housing markets can have persistent consequences for economic activity. However, relatively
little is known about how markets for consumer products respond to local conditions over
the business cycle. I focus on the introduction of new product varieties, which decreases the
price level when consumers exhibit love for variety in their preferences.
This paper shows that multi-city retailers transmit the welfare consequences of business
cycle shocks across cities through the synchronized introduction of new products across the
cities in which they operate. I begin by using scanner data to establish three empirical
findings that indicate that net product entry at the city level is primarily related to the
decisions of retailers who syncronize their introduction of products across cities. Second, I
build a quantitative model of retailer product choice to measure how much transmission of
1
the welfare effects of city-level business cycle shocks occurs through common retailers.
I use barcode-store-level data from grocery retailers from Nielsen to study net product
entry in 26 large US cities from 2006-2014. The data include revenue and average weekly
prices at the barcode-store level. Because the scanner data set includes the universe of sales
of barcoded products within participating retailer stores, the set of products in the data
represents a complete picture of all varieties purchased by consumers at these stores.
Using the data, I document three findings that establish the role of retailers in explaining
net product entry at the city level. First, I show that net product entry across cities varied
from 9 to 15 percentage points during the period 2008-2010 and from 15 to 20 percent during
the period 2011-2014, suggesting meaningful differences in the availability of new products
to consumers across cities. Broda and Weinstein (2010) show that aggregate net product
entry is procyclical. However, differences in city-level demand growth explain little of the
cross-city variation. Alternative measures of the local business cycle such as local GDP
growth, wage growth, or house price growth are also uncorrelated with city-level changes in
local product variety.
Second, I find that retailers coordinate the introduction of new products across all cities
in which they operate. Eighty-six percent of new products (by value) are introduced in all
of a retailer’s markets within a one-year period. Variation at the retailer level explains most
of the variation in net product entry across city-retailers. I decompose net product entry in
each retailer-city into retailer and city components and find that the retailer component can
account for 88 percent of the variation in net product entry in an average year. Relationships
with manufacturers do not appear to drive the coordination of product entry by retailers.
On average, a retailer that already sells products from a particular manufacturer introduces
only twelve percent of new barcoded products from that manufacturer.
Third, I find that the retailer’s decision to supply new products is strongly related to
changes in total sales by the retailer. I measure changes in demand two ways. First, I use
growth in the retailer’s sales across all markets as a direct measure of demand growth. I
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regress net product entry by the retailer in each city on growth in retailer sales and find
a positive and significant relationship. However, the OLS estimate may be contaminated
by simultaneity if the retailer experiences a productivity shock or by reverse causation if
firms that introduce new products attract a significantly larger share of demand. In order to
relate net product entry to a plausibly exogenous measure of changes in demand, I construct
a measure of city-level demand growth weighted by the retailer’s share in each market and
use it as an instrument for retailer sales growth. The identifying assumption is that changes
in MSA-level grocery expenditure are independent of the supply decisions of any particular
retailer. I find that a 10 percent increase in a retailer’s demand instrumented with the
weighted demand growth measure is associated with a 3.6 percent change in new products
by value introduced by the retailer.
In sum, the empirical findings show that there is significant variation in net product
entry across cities, not driven by differences in local business cycles. Instead, I find that
product entry occurs as the result of changes in the set of varieties offered by retailers in
response to changes in their total sales. Product entry across a retailer’s markets is highly
coordinated, suggesting that retailers introduce the same set of products across cities in
response to changes in their combined sales. As a result, retailer product entry can act
as a mechanism through which the welfare impact of business cycle shocks is transmitted
across cities. An increase in demand in one city will motivate retailers operating in that
city to introduce new products. Because they also receive the newly introduced products,
all other cities served by those retailers will inherit part of the welfare gain associated with
the demand growth experienced by just one city.
In order to measure the extent to which retailer product entry decisions transmit shocks
across cities, I construct a quantitative model that I calibrate using the microdata. Multi-
city retailers choose a set of products to offer to consumers. Because consumer preferences
exhibit love for variety, retailers can increase their revenue by increasing the set of products
they offer. However, retailers face a convex fixed cost associated with increasing their set of
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products. Consistent with the empirical finding that retailers introduce the same products
across all markets, all fixed costs associated with the introduction of new products are paid
nationally. The optimal number of products offered by the retailer will increase as a function
of its total revenue.
City-level productivity shocks affect the number of available varieties through a change
in demand in each of each retailer’s markets, prompting the retailer to change its product
set. The same change in the number of products occurs within all the retailer’s stores,
redistributing the welfare impact of city-level shocks across all cities in which the retailer
operates. I derive analytical expressions that relate the welfare gains associated with new
products to changes in demand in the cities in which the retailer operates and two parameters:
the elasticity of demand governing the welfare contribution of new products and a parameter
governing the curvature of the fixed cost function.
I calibrate the two key parameters of the model using the microdata. First, I calibrate
the parameter governing the curvature of the fixed cost function to the observed elasticity
of net product entry to demand growth. Second, I calibrate the elasticity of substitution
across goods, which will determine the magnitude of the response of the price level to net
product entry. I begin by using the barcode-level microdata to estimate microelasticities as
in Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2010). I consolidate the set of microelastic-
ities into a single ‘macro’-elasticity by matching the elasticity of city-level welfare gains to
city-level net product entry. The ‘macro’-elasticity between goods is essentially a weighted
average of the microelasticities, a calibration strategy that avoids the bias associated with
estimating a macroelasticity directly. I calculate the response of net product entry in the
model to productivity shocks that I set equal to consumption growth over the periods of the
recession and recovery.
To evaluate the model’s fit, I compare the welfare gains from product entry experienced
by consumers in the model with welfare gains calculated using barcode-level microdata.
Because the productivity shock in the model affects demand for all products equally, net
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product entry in the model need not result in the same estimated welfare gains as I do using
data on consumption of each barcoded product at each retailer in each city. Nevertheless, I
find that the retailer model captures city-level welfare gains well.
I then decompose the model-generated gains from new products experienced in each
city into a contribution coming from each other city. The model implies that the effect
of outside demand shocks on each city’s net product entry is proportional to the share of
retailer revenues generated in outside cities. The average city generates less than half of
total revenues for the retailers operating in that city, suggesting that outside demand shocks
can significantly affect net product entry in the average city. The model predicts that 63
percent of the welfare gains in the average city result from shocks in other cities.
The model implies that the impact of city-level demand growth on consumer welfare
in each city depends on the extent of product market integration between cities. In order
to quantify the extent to which the empirical distribution of retailers amplifies city-level
differences in business cycle outcomes, I compare the baseline model to two counterfactual
retailer distributions. At one extreme, if all retailers operated in only one market, the entry
of new products would respond only to local demand growth. On the other, if all retailers
operated nationally, the entry of new products would respond to the aggregate business
cycle. I compare the variation of gains from new products across cities in the calibrated
baseline model to these two polar counterfactuals in which I generate predictions for gains
from net product entry. In the local counterfactual, I generate welfare predictions under a
distribution of shares such that each operates in only one city. In the national counterfactual,
I set market shares such that all retailers operate nationally.
I find that the variation in welfare gains across cities in the local counterfactual is 47
percent higher than in the baseline model. This suggests that multi-city retailers smooth
the welfare gains from local demand shocks across cities. However, the observed distribution
of retailers still results in city-level welfare gains that amplify differences in business cycle
outcomes across cities. Under the counterfactual distribution of retailers in which all retailers
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operate nationally, there is no variation in city-level welfare gains from product entry. The
fact that there is still considerable idiosyncratic variation across cities under the observed
distribution of retailer shares is consistent with the observation that most food retailers
are regional rather than national: retailer demand responds to a subset of all idiosyncratic
city-level demand shocks.
This paper relates to a recent literature that has connected product variety to produc-
tivity growth and the business cycle. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2010) and Aghion et al
(2017) study the implications of new product creation for measured productivity. Broda
and Weinstein (2010) and Erickson and Pakes (2011) consider the impact of product entry
and exit on the measured consumer price level. I contribute to the literature by considering
cyclical net product entry at the local level, I am able to measure the welfare impact of new
products available to consumers in their own product markets.
A second related literature studies changes in the consumer price level over the cycle.
Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Hong (2012) and Jaimovich, Rebelo and Wong (2017) find that
consumer substitution across stores and product qualities represents a significant source of
bias affecting measured consumer prices and their business cycle implications. Argente and
Lee (2016) focus on the distributional implications of cyclical substitution. Gagnon and
Lopez-Salido (2014) present evidence that local prices do not respond to local shocks. I
incorporate the findings of this literature by allowing for substitution across retailers and
echoes the implication that prices are not determined at the local level. My paper is the
first in this literature to explicitly consider retailers as a source of inter-city business cycle
propagation.
Finally, this paper contributes to an extensive literature that studies regional business
cycles. Moretti (2011) provides a recent review of the literature on local labor markets. Han-
son (2005) and Bartelme (2015) emphasize the role of regional market access in explaining
regional economic outcomes. Asdrubali et al (1996), Stumpner (2014) and Caliendo et al
(2017) consider mechanisms through which regional shocks propagate within the U.S. This
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paper presents a novel channel by which local shocks may be transmitted through the price
level.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section
3 presents empirical evidence that local product variety is determined by retailer product
selection. Section 4 develops a model in which retailer product choice transmits demand
shocks across cities. Section 5 describes how parameters of the model are calibrated to match
moments in the data. Section 6 discusses the implications of the model for transmission of
shocks across cities. Section 7 concludes.
2 Product Variety in Scanner Data
2.1 Data Description
Data on consumer products come from the Nielsen Retail Scanner data for the period 2006-
2014.1 The data contain average weekly prices and quantities for all UPC barcodes sold in
participating stores across the United States along with descriptive information about the
UPC created by Nielsen. Data are sent directly from the retailer or its parent company to
Nielsen. Participating retailers include grocery, mass market, convenience and liquor stores,
with the best coverage in the first two categories.2 The data cover a significant proportion
of consumer spending on food at home, but the fraction of total food-at-home expenditures
captured in the data does vary across cities due to differences in the share of local expenditure
within participating retailers. I restrict my analysis to 26 metropolitan areas in the sample
with populations above 2 million and expenditure coverage above 25 percent in grocery and
mass market stores as reported by Nielsen.3 For convenience, I refer to metropolitan areas
as ‘cities.’
1These data are available through the Kilts Center for Marketing at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business.
2Mass market retailers carry the range of products commonly sold at grocery stores and non-grocery
products, such as clothing or furniture.
3At least 40 percent of the US population lives within these metro areas according the 2010 Census.
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This paper focuses on the entry and exit of final goods into retailers rather than entry
and exit of retailers into city markets. Retailers freely select into providing data to Nielsen,
making the data a noisy source of information about the entry and exit of individual grocery
stores or retail chains. To avoid the issue of entry and exit of retailers themselves, I restrict
the data to a sample that contains continuing retailers over each two-year horizon. For
instance, retailers included in the sample for 2010 will include all retailers who also sold
in 2008 and 2009 without change of ownership. These stores account for 60 percent of all
expenditures in the Retail Scanner Data.
Because of the issues noted with interpreting entry and exit of retailers in the scanner
data, I also consider the contribution of continuing retailers to total consumer expenditures
using an alternate data source produced by Nielsen, the Homescan (HMS) data collected
from household barcode scans. Because this data set records expenditures reported by the
household at all retailers, not just those that share store-level data with Nielsen, it provides
a more comprehensive look at the set of retailers available to the consumer in each city. In
this data set, retailers that continue to sell over a two-year horizon account for 99 percent
of expenditures in the average city-year, while retailers that continue to sell over the entire
2006-2014 period account for 96 percent. This suggests that retailer entry over the business
cycle is not a quantitatively important phenomenon.
While the data contain both grocery and non-grocery UPCs, coverage is not uniform
across categories. As an additional check on the data, I compare characteristics of the
scanner data to the HMS data. I examine the revenue growth rates in each city-year for
each product group as defined by Nielsen.4 In the HMS grocery categories, average revenue
growth is 1.9 percent on average, while it is 4.2 percent in the non-grocery data. Revenue
growth in grocery categories is 0.9 percent on average in the retail scanner data and 0.8
percent in non-grocery. The very low growth in non-grocery sales is likely the result of
4Nielsen classifies UPCs into nested categories in order of increasing detail: departments, product groups
and product modules. A 14 ounce can of Dole peaches would be found in the canned peach module, the
canned fruit group, and the dry goods department.
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less reliable coverage in these categories: most retailers in the sample specialize in grocery
products. I restrict my analysis to grocery categories (other than fresh produce and meats,
which are less likely to have UPCs). These data account for 62 percent of expenditures in the
retail scanner data and 68 percent of expenditures reported by households in the HMS data.
Last, to screen for potential problems in data reporting, I restrict the sample to product
categories that are available in all years within a retailer. This step eliminates about 0.5
percent of all expenditures in the sample.
Table I.1 lists descriptive statistics by city in the final sample averaged over the years
2006-2014. Even after removing non-continuing stores, non-grocery UPCs and outlier prod-
uct categories, the retail scanner data represent about twice as many products per city as the
household scanner data collected by Nielsen over the same time period because products are
included in the dataset if even one consumer purchases them from a participating retailer.
These data include 18,629 stores corresponding to 71 retailers. Nielsen defines stores based
on particular chain brands, rather than by parent company.5 In the analysis, I focus on the
retail parent. Total expenditures in the final dataset used for analysis represent 80.3 billion
dollars of grocery expenditure on average per year, or about 12.5 percent of all expenditures
on food at home in the United States.6 The percentage of grocery expenditure in each city
that is captured by the retail scanner data varies across cities, but expenditures are broadly
increasing in city size. While the data only covers food expenditures, which make up about
10 percent of consumer expenditures each year, other categories of consumer expenditure
likely exhibit gains from variety as well. Consumption of all non-durables accounts for about
22 percent of expenditures.
Most retailers in the data sell in only a fraction of all 26 cities of the data, but revenue
per market increases with city size. Table I.2 describes how many one-city and multi-city
5The identities of retailers and parent companies in the sample are not released by Nielsen. One parent
company ID may be associated with several retailer IDs. For example, XYZ Groceries, Inc. might have two
types of retail location: XYZ Full and XYZ Express. These two chains would typically have different retailer
IDs and the same parent ID. Some companies prefer to aggregate data to the parent-level before sending to
Nielsen.
6Based on expenditure estimates from the Economic Research Service, USDA.
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Table I.1: Descriptive Statistics
City Number of Products Number of Stores Number of Retailers Total Expenditures (millions)
Atlanta 197,893 1,651 13 2,746
Baltimore 208,079 1,559 15 4,556
Boston 183,186 2,110 15 4,854
Charlotte 175,999 1,263 13 2,077
Chicago 240,105 2,495 15 5,314
Cincinnati 156,133 664 10 1,717
Columbus 177,728 604 9 1,611
Dallas 193,581 1,596 12 2,967
Denver 200,491 1,215 16 3,317
Detroit 156,999 1,207 8 2,034
Houston 186,473 1,560 9 2,550
Los Angeles 206,582 3,014 14 8,277
Miami 142,462 963 9 1,245
New York 258,936 4,563 22 7,927
Orlando 155,209 1,174 13 986
Philadelphia 227,422 2,447 19 4,059
Phoenix 193,467 1,349 11 3,433
Pittsburgh 200,881 958 11 1,607
Portland 167,338 648 10 2,029
Raleigh-Durham 181,228 1,119 12 1,905
Sacramento 162,833 734 12 1,769
San Diego 171,210 516 10 1,790
San Francisco 166,459 1,271 10 3,930
Seattle 174,884 1,080 10 3,572
Tampa 148,770 1,305 13 1,187
Washington, D.C. 206,276 801 15 1,773
Notes: Values in each column represent the average over the years of the sample, 2006-2014.
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Table I.2: Retailers by Number of Cities
Cities Number of Retailers Average City Revenue
1 23 475
2 14 777
3 9 1,170
4-6 8 1,090
7-10 7 1,540
11+ 9 3,060
Notes: The table reports the maximum number of cities in which the retailer sells between 2006-
2014 and the average per-market sales (in millions) per year for those retailers.
retailers there are in the data. While retailers operating in only one city make up almost one
third of all retailers in the data, retailers that operate in multiple cities have significantly
higher revenue per market.
This dataset captures expenditures at physical stores in each city in the sample, but
consumers may have access to grocery products through online retailers. In principle, differ-
ences in the set of varieties available in local stores could be unimportant if consumers shop
online, thereby access a common national set of varieties. During the period, expenditures
at online retailers account for about 1 percent of all expenditures in the HMS data for any
given year, suggesting that online retailers occupy a low share of grocery expenditure. Of
course, it is possible both that online shopping is underreported compared to shopping at
physical retailers and that the prevalence of online grocery shopping has grown since 2014,
the last year of the sample. In section 6.2, I consider how the transmission of business cycle
shocks and consumer welfare would differ if all retailers operated nationally. Were online
retailers to represent a increasingly large fraction of expenditures, outcomes would approach
this counterfactual, in which entry of variety responds to aggregate demand because retailers
are active in all cities.
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2.2 Defining the Entry and Exit Horizon
In the retail scanner data, entry and exit of products must be inferred from the time series of
UPC sales, since there are no data on goods held in inventory. Over short horizons, inference
about product entry and exit is likely to be complicated by inventory considerations, partial
year effects, and clearance sales. To lessen this ambiguity, I choose to consider the extensive
margin over periods of at least two years. In particular, a product is counted as new in year
t if it is sold in year t, but not year t − 2. Similarly, a product is said to exit the market
in year t if it is sold in t but not in t + 2. This timing convention allows direct comparison
between the revenue of entering and exiting products in year t. Because this time horizon
implicitly allows a product to be counted as entering or exiting for two years, I annualize
the net product entry rates obtained using the two-year horizon.
Considering the cost of keeping unsuccessful products on the shelf and the fact that
many grocery products are subject to spoilage, it is unlikely that a product would remain
unsold but in inventory for a year or longer. Similarly, the wo-year horizon avoids the
well-documented partial year problem: new products may enter partway through the year,
making their sales hard to compare with those of existing products. The two year horizon
also helps to avoid attributing a low expenditure weight to products that are initially less
familiar to the consumer, resulting in low sales immediately after entry, or to those that
go on clearance sale just before they are eliminated. These issues are likely to result in
low revenue, but the resulting prices and expenditure will confound marketing or inventory
considerations with the utility that the consumer derives from the product. After calculating
entry and exit rates based on the two-year horizon, growth rates in this paper are annualized
by dividing by two.
Using Homescan data from Nielsen over an earlier period, Broda and Weinstein (2010)
choose to consider product entry over a longer four-year horizon: a product is counted as
‘entering’ in 2010 if it is sold in 2010 and not in 2006, regardless of sales in 2007, 2008 or
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2009. They argue that the long horizon captures the revenue share of new products better
than a short horizon, in which new products may not have realized their full potential sales.
However, the long horizon also excludes any products that are sold for less than four years.
More than 55 percent of products that are observed to enter the national market between
2006-2012 sell for three years or less. Nearly 15 percent of these products sell for less than
two years. Because the Retail Scanner data offer a larger sample of consumer expenditures
than the Homescan data, it is possible to use a shorter horizon.
3 Three Findings about Net Product Entry
This section documents three findings about city-level net product entry and the associated
reduction in the price faced by consumers. First, I show that despite the aggregate procycli-
cality of net product entry, local business cycles do not appear to explain variation in net
product entry at the city level. Using an approach similar to that in Broda and Weinstein
(2010), I calculate implied welfare gains from net product entry and show that they are both
sizable and variable across cities. The magnitude of city-level welfare gains is weakly related
to local demand growth. Second, I show that retailers, rather than city demand conditions,
appear to drive local net product entry. Third, I show that net product entry at the retailer
level is strongly related to the retailer’s revenue growth stemming from demand shocks across
all its markets.
3.1 City-level Demand Does Not Explain Local Net Product En-
try
I use the Nielsen data to measure changes in the set of available products in each of 26 cities.
Net product entry is pro-cyclical, but the extent of product variety changes across US cities
varies considerably. Figure 3.1 displays the average net entry of new products by value each
year over the period of the recession, 2008-2010, and the recovery, 2011-2014, against one-
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Figure 3.1: Net Product Entry by Value and City-Level Expenditure Growth
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Notes: The figure plots average annual net entry of products for the periods 2008-2010 and 2011-2014 against average annual
lagged city-level expenditure growth in the Nielsen Retail Scanner data in 26 US cities.
year-lagged city level expenditure growth over each period.7 The figure also plots a linear
regression of average annual net product entry on average lagged city-level expenditure
growth for each period. The relationship is positive but statistically insignificant: city-level
expenditure growth does not appear to explain variation in product entry across cities. While
changes in expenditure growth in each city represent the most natural measure of business
cycle movements in the Retail Scanner data, I also test the relationship between net product
entry and other measures of the business cycle such as city-level GDP per capita growth, city-
level wage growth, and changes in city-level house prices. Among these measures, lagged
expenditure growth is most correlated with net product entry and the associated welfare
gains. In what follows, I show that product entry is determined by retailers, rather than
city-level shocks.
In order to understand how much new products matter for consumer welfare, it is nec-
essary to take a stance on the consumer’s utility function. I follow Feenstra (1994) and
Broda and Weinstein (2010) in assuming that consumers have CES preferences. A key char-
7Net product entry exhibits a positive but insignificant relationship with contemporaneous consumption
growth.
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acteristic of a CES price index is that all else equal, an increase in the number of products
reduces the price level because consumers have a love for variety. For smaller elasticities of
substitution, the negative effect of new products on the price level is larger.
Following Broda and Weinstein (2010), I assume that consumers have a three-tier utility
function over goods. However, I also allow grocery retailers to be imperfect substitutes, while
retailers in their model of consumption are perfect substitutes. Evidence from the literature
on shopping behavior over the business cycle suggests that consumer shopping behavior is
consistent with imperfect substitutability across retailers. Griffith et al. (2009) find that
most households shop for groceries once or twice a week. Nevo and Wong (2015) and Coibion,
Gorodnichenko and Hong (2015) find evidence that households increase shopping intensity
during recessions, including store-switching, implying that there is a cost associated with
substitution across retailers.
The tiers of the price index consist of UPCs aggregated to a brand-product ‘module’,
brand-product modules aggregated to a coarser product ‘group’, product groups aggregated
within a retailer, and retailers aggregated to total grocery consumption.8 The utility function
first aggregates consumption over goods within a retailer, then aggregates across retailers.
Following Broda and Weinstein (2010), I estimate elasticities of substitution for each tier
of the utility function following a GMM approach that relies on the identifying assumption
that demand and supply shocks are uncorrelated. In Appendix 7, I discuss this approach
in more detail and report statistics on the elasticities I calculate. I find a median cross-
UPC elasticity of 6.23, consistent with magnitudes in the literature. In the appendix, I
also discuss an alternate approach to estimating elasticities developed by Hausman (1996)
that uses price changes in other markets as an instrument for supply shocks. As in other
studies, I find a much smaller cross-UPC elasticity of 1.93 using the Hausman approach.
To maintain comparability with Broda and Weinstein (2010), I report estimates using their
approach in the main text. Note that using smaller elasticities would produce systematically
8Product modules represent fine product categories (’Canned Peaches’ vs ’Canned Pineapple’) while
product groups represent broad product categories (’Canned Fruit’ vs ’Coffee’).
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larger estimates of the welfare gains from new products, thereby amplifying the differences
in outcomes across cities as well.
For brevity, I describe the price level of a generic tier x of the four-tier utility function,
with elements v. In the absence of shocks to demand for x, the two-year growth in the exact
price index, pix,t for each tier x can be written as
pix,t =
∏
v∈Ω∗xt
(
pv,t
pv,t−2
)ωvt (
λx,t
λx,t−2
) 1
σx−1
. (3.1)
Inflation is a composite of two components: the change in the prices of elements v of the
set of common elements Ω∗xt, which are sold in both t and t− 2, and a correction reflecting
the value of net product entry. The contribution of each common element is weighted by
Sato (1976)-Vartia (1976) weights defined as:
ωvt =
svt−svt−1
ln svt−ln svt−1∑
Ω∗xt
svt−svt−1
ln svt−ln svt−1
.
The term λx,t is defined as the share of expenditures on common elements in the set Ω∗xt, a
subset of all products sold in the period Ωxt:
λx,t =
∑
v∈Ω∗xt pv,tcv,t∑
v∈Ωxt pv,tcv,t
.
Imagine that all else equal, a new product is introduced and consumed in period t that was
not available in period t − 2. In this case, λx,t < 1, and λx,t−2 = 1. Because the share of
common expenditures has fallen between the two periods, this lowers the price level. The
degree to which the entry of new products lowers the price level is regulated by the elasticity
of substitution σx between goods: when goods are more substitutable, entry has a smaller
impact on the price level.
Because new products lower the price level, consumer welfare rises. Average annual
implied welfare gains from new products under this model of consumer demand are displayed
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Figure 3.2: Welfare Gains from New Products and City-Level Expenditure Growth
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Notes: The figure plots welfare gains derived from a four-tier CES price index for the periods 2008-2010 and 2011-2014 against
lagged city-level expenditure growth in the Nielsen Retail Scanner data in 26 US cities.
in Figure 3.2.9 In total over the two periods, gains from 2008-2010 range from 3.2 to 5
percentage points across cities, while they range from 4.3-6.7 percent from 2011-2014. Once
again, differences in welfare gains across cities within a given year are weakly explained by
city-level expenditure growth.
3.2 Retailers Drive Product Entry
The weak relationship between the local business cycle and local product entry is surprising
in light of the aggregate procyclicality of net product entry. This apparent contradiction is
resolved if product entry decisions are driven by considerations at a more aggregate level. To
understand what drives the entry of new products, I examine the entry pattern of products
within a retailer. In principle, retailers may choose what products to offer at any level
of disaggregation: from selecting an individual set of products for each physical store to
choosing one set of products for every store across all markets. To explore this question, I
study the behavior of products that enter or exit at least one market in a particular year.
9Appendix Figures C.1 and C.2 plots the relationship between welfare gains and GDP growth and housing
price growth respectively.
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Table I.3: Extensive Margin Entry and Exit Patterns by Number of Initial Markets
Markets 2009 Product Enters All Product Exits All Share of
Retailer’s Markets (%) Retailer’s Markets (%) Value (%)
1 100 100 16
2-13 86 74 64
14-25 81 52 3
26 87 59 17
Overall 88 75 100
Notes: The ‘Markets 2009’ column shows the total number of cities in which the retailer sells within size bins. The entry and
exit columns display the share of average quarterly revenue represented by products that enter all of the retailer’s markets
within a one-year period. The ’share of value’ column displays the share of the overall value of entering or exiting products
represented by retailers in each size bin.
To fix ideas, I focus on 2009, the year with the most striking extensive margin movement.10
In Table I.3, I report how much of new product entry by value within each retailer
consists of products that are introduced in all of that retailer’s markets within a one-year
period. I divide retailers into size bins: while retailers that sell in just one city and national
retailers each account for a significant fraction of new product entry, most new products are
introduced in mid-sized retailers, often retailers with a regional presence. Because products
may enter or exit in different quarters, shares of total entering or exiting value are calculated
based on average quarterly revenue in the relevant time period. Across all retailer sizes,
an average of 88 percent of new products are introduced simultaneously across all markets.
While exiting products represent a smaller share of total value, I also look at product exit
within retailers. Exit is less coordinated, but 70 percent of products that cease to be sold
by multi-market retailers exit all cities within a one-year period.
The high percentage of total entering or exiting value that enters or exits all markets
simultaneously in Table I.3 suggests that many retailers sell a similar set of products across
all markets. This finding is particularly striking given the fact that the majority of retailers
operate in a relatively small number of markets, suggesting that the cost of managing even a
small number of markets individually is high. Another potential explanation might be that
10Results for all years 2008-2012 are similar. Entry/exit grids for the years 2009 and 2011 are displayed
in Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2.
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idiosyncratic regional business cycle shocks were simply insignificant in magnitude relative
to the aggregate shock. However, local business cycles differed significantly over the period:
the standard deviation of expenditure growth in the period 2008-2010 was 4.85 percentage
points and 5.61 percentage points over the period 2011-2014. Later in the paper, I develop
a model of retailer product selection that will help to distinguish these two cases.
It is possible that retailers introduce products simultaneously because the producer of
the product itself has decided to sell its product in those markets. To address this possibility,
I look at the fraction of retailers in each city in which new products are sold. I find that
only about one third of retailers stock any given entering product, no matter how many
markets the product is sold in. This remains true even among retailers that already stock
another UPC from the same brand. While this is merely suggestive evidence, it indicates
that retailers are able to select different product lines facing the same set of new products
offered by producers.
Finally, to provide further support for the apparent finding that the retailer chooses its
products globally rather than choosing a separate product line for each market, I decompose
the growth in the entry of new products nˆri,t in a retailer-city at time t into common compo-
nents coming from the retailer r in each year t, denoted αˆrt, and from the city in each year,
denoted βˆit as follows
nˆri,t = αˆrt + βˆit + rit. (3.2)
I report results year-by-year and pooled across all years 2008-2014 in Table I.4, as well as
the F-statistic for the joint significance of each set of fixed effects and the associated p-value.
The partial R2 compares the share of the variation in new product entry that is explained
by the full model reported in equation (3.2) with a model containing only one set of fixed
effects. If the share of the variation explained by the model falls significantly when one set
of fixed effects is omitted, that means that the partial R2 associated with that set of fixed
effects is high. Because there may be some covariance between retailer- and city-time fixed
effects, the partial R2 associated with both sets of fixed effects can be greater than one. Note
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Table I.4: City-Retailer Level Product Entry Decomposition
Retailer City
Partial R2 F-stat P-val Partial R2 F-stat P-val
2008 0.84 143.33 0.00 0.11 58.41 0.00
2009 0.88 206.16 0.00 0.12 77.73 0.00
2010 0.84 107.60 0.00 0.13 49.27 0.00
2011 0.89 207.36 0.00 0.15 74.48 0.00
2012 0.90 246.99 0.00 0.14 72.59 0.00
2013 0.90 249.11 0.00 0.17 66.13 0.00
2014 0.89 158.28 0.00 0.24 50.90 0.00
Mean 0.88 188.41 0.00 0.15 64.22 0.00
Pooled 0.75 16.11 0.00 0.13 5.90 0.00
Notes: The table reports statistics associated with regression equation (3.2) for each year, the
mean across years, and a pooled regression. The pooled regression also includes a time-invariant
city-retailer fixed effect.
that the pooled regression also includes time invariant city-year fixed effects. Both sets of
fixed effects are highly statistically significant. Retailer fixed effects explain 88 percent of
the variation in the entry of new products, while city fixed effects explain 15 percent. This
finding suggests that coordinated introduction of new products by retailers explains most of
the growth in product variety across cities.
3.3 Net Product Entry Co-moves with Retailer Revenue
The previous two findings suggest that gains from new products experienced in each city are
better explained by retailer shocks than city-level shocks, but I have not yet explained what
motivates a retailer to introduce new products. Now, I will show that retailers introduce new
products in response to a positive shock to their total revenue. I begin by estimating a simple
regression of new product entry at the retailer-city level on changes in the retailer’s lagged
total revenue across all markets. However, it is possible that this regression is contaminated
by endogeneity: a retailer’s revenue may increase because it has introduced new products.
To address this concern, I construct a measure of plausibly exogenous demand growth at
the retailer level by weighting city-level growth in total grocery expenditure, denoted Xˆit, by
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Table I.5: Net Product Entry and Retailer Revenue Growth
OLS IV
Revenue Growthr,t−1 0.12 0.22
(.01) (.03)
Retailers 70 70
Observations 2,007 2,007
R2 0.13
F -stat 183
(0.00)
Notes: The figure reports results of the regression equations (3.4) and (3.5) for each
city-retailer-year.
the share of the retailer’s revenue coming from that city, denoted ωrit. The retailer demand
shock Zˆrt is given by
Zˆrt =
∑
i
ωritXˆit. (3.3)
I estimate the relationship between net product entry at the city-retailer level and changes
in retailer demand coming from shocks to total city-level demand via two-stage least squares
as follows:
Xˆrt = α0 + α1Zˆrt + urt (3.4)
nˆrit = β0 + β1Xˆrt + rit, (3.5)
where Xˆrt denotes the growth of the retailer’s total revenue across all cities. Table I.5 reports
the results of the OLS regression of equation (I.5) and 2SLS regression of equations (3.4)
and (3.5). The F -statistic of 183 suggests that the weighted city demand growth measure
constructed in equation (3.3) satisfies the instrument relevance requirement. The IV estimate
is highly statistically significant and suggests that a 10 percent increase in revenue growth
due to a demand shock is associated with 2.2 percent net product entry. The average net
product entry across retailer-city-years is 5.1 percent in the sample.
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The finding that retailers drive differences in product entry across cities in response to
changes in their demand motivates the model of retailer product choice that follows. Because
net product entry in each retailer-city responds to total revenue, it suggests a mechanism
through which demand shocks in one city can impact consumer welfare in another. Through
the lens of the model I develop below, I am able to quantify the extent of inter-city demand
shock transmission during the period covered by the data.
4 A Model of Retailer Product Choice
This section develops a model that can be used to demonstrate how retailer networks affect
the propagation of local demand shocks across cities. The model environment consists of a
set I of cities, indexed by i, with units of labor Li supplied inelastically and immobile across
cities. There are R retailers in the economy, with a set Ri active in market i, intended to
capture the uneven distribution of retailers across cities in the data. The sets of active firms
in each city are given, but the share of each retailer is determined by relative prices and
city-specific retailer tastes.
Households choose consumption based on a three-tiered utility function. Grocery retailers
sell a retailer-specific grocery bundle. They choose the length of their product lines subject
to an increasing stocking cost and set a markup over the producer price of the grocery good.
The model is static. Business cycle analysis compares steady states under different levels of
city productivity ai.
4.1 Preferences
Consumers in each city i derive utility from a three-tier utility function. The top tier
expresses how consumers aggregate grocery consumption Ci and non-grocery consumption
Yi. The final consumption good is a Cobb-Douglas function of differentiated final grocery
consumption and homogeneous non-grocery consumption:
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Ui = Cβi Y
1−β
i . (4.1)
Final grocery consumption Ci is a two-tier CES aggregate that allows the elasticity of substi-
tution to differ across retailers and across goods. The second tier describes preferences over
the grocery consumption bundles available at each retailer r. The elasticity of substitution
between retailers is given by σr. A taste shifter γri allows for the possibility that retailers
have characteristics beyond their pricing that affect consumer demand:
Ci = (
∑
r∈Ri
γ
1
σr
ri C
σr−1
σr
ri )
σr
σr−1 . (4.2)
Because the set of retailers Ri remains constant across the sample, there are no direct gains
from variety stemming from the entry of new retailers. However, if prices across retailers vary
as the result of differences in goods prices or the number of products available, σr determines
how much consumers substitute toward the lower-cost store bundle.
Finally, the consumption aggregate available at each retailer, Cri, is an aggregate over
the set of varieties supplied by the retailer:
Cri = (
∫
v∈Ωri
Cri(v)
σg−1
σg dv)
σg
σg−1 . (4.3)
Denote the measure of the set Ωri as nri. Because retailers choose how many products to
offer, the within-retailer, across-good elasticity σg directly affects the number of varieties in
a group. For the sake of tractability, I assume that the across-good elasticity is the same
across all grocery goods.
23
4.2 Firms
4.2.1 Grocery Retailers
Grocery retailers r choose how many product varieties to sell and choose a markup µri to
set on all products in order to maximize their total profits subject to a stocking cost F (nr)
with F ′(nr) > 0. For simplicity, I assume that the average marginal cost of goods sold at the
retailer m¯c is unaffected by the number of products chosen and is common to all retailers.
Retailers face total grocery expenditures Xi and a price level Pi in each city. The retailer’s
problem can be expressed as
max
µri,nr
I∑
i=1
γri
(
1− 1
µri
)n
1
1−σg
ri µrim¯c
Pi

1−σr
Xi − F (nr) (4.4)
The retailer’s price level is given by
Pri = n
1
1−σg
ri µrim¯c (4.5)
and Pi denotes the city grocery price level, defined as
Pi =
∑
r∈Ri
γriP
1−σr
ri
 11−σr . (4.6)
For all cities i such that r /∈ Ri, the taste parameter γri is equal to zero. Fixed costs
are paid nationally based on the total product line across all markets nr = max{nri}i∈I .
Because the fixed cost is paid nationally, there is no motive for the retailer to choose an
individual product line nri for each market. However, I do allow for a relationship of the
form nri = τinr between the global product line and the set of varieties ultimately available
in city i. The term τi can be interpreted as an additional cost associated with providing
varieties to city i if τi < 1.
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Practically, this term allows the model to rationalize the fact that New York and Los
Angeles experience slightly higher gains from variety than other cities even within retailers,
though this is unrelated to changes in demand in those two cities. Setting τi = 1∀i will yield
the same predictions quantitatively and qualitatively for every city but these two.
The first order condition with respect to the choice of µri is standard:
dµri : γri
(
1
µ2ri
)n
1
1−σg
ri µrm¯c
Pi

1−σr
Xi + (1− σr)
(
1− 1
µri
)
sri(1− sri)Xi
µri
= 0 (4.7)
where sri = γri
n 11−σgri µrim¯c
Pi
1−σr . The firm faces a trade-off between profit-per-unit and
its share of the market: increasing the markup increases flow profits per unit, but tends to
decrease the firm’s overall share. I assume that firms are small enough that s2ri ≈ 0, i.e. that
firms set the monopolistically competitive markup rather than a variable markup based on
retailer share.
The first order condition with respect to the choice of nr is
dnr :
I∑
i=1
[
1− σr
1− σg
(
1− 1
µri
)
sri
Xi
nr
− 1− σr1− σg
(
1− 1
µri
)
s2ri
Xi
nr
]
− F ′(nr) = 0. (4.8)
As noted, increasing the length of the product line increases the retailer’s share of demand
because the consumer has love for variety: the same utility of consumption is less expensive
at a retailer whose grocery bundle includes more varieties. I assume that F ′(0) = 0 so that
all retailers sell products.
Solving these two first order conditions yields the standard optimal gross markup
µri =
1
σr − 1 + 1 (4.9)
25
The optimal product line is given by
nr =
1
(σg − 1)µri
∑
i sriXi
F ′(nr)
. (4.10)
Higher marginal stocking costs and greater substitutability between goods both lead to
shorter product lines. All else equal, a retailer with larger global sales will have a longer
product line. However, if the degree of substitutability across retailers is low, µri will be
high and the product line will be shorter.
4.2.2 Goods Producers
Both grocery goods C and non-grocery goods Y are produced by perfectly competitive firms
with technology aiLi. The price of the non-grocery consumption good is the numeraire, and
the good is freely traded. Grocery goods are also freely traded and produced with a common
productivity ai in each market, giving a marginal cost m¯ci = wiai .
4.2.3 Retailer Profits
There are aggregate profits in the economy because free entry does not hold in the retail
sector. They depend on the size of the retailer and on the stocking cost F (nr). Given
equations (4.9) and (4.10), the general expression for the retailer’s profits pir is
pir =
Xr
σr
− F (nr) (4.11)
Let the stocking cost be given by
F (nr) =
(
nr
nc
)α
. (4.12)
The term in the denominator nc will allow for trend growth in the number of varieties and
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accommodate differences in trend growth across the four categories to which food retailers
in the data belong: convenience stores, drug stores, grocery stores and mass retailers. The
length of the product line under this stocking cost parametrization is given by
nr =
[ ∑
i sriXi
α(σg − 1)µri
] 1
α
nc (4.13)
If α > 1, the stocking cost is strictly convex in the length of the product line nr.
Profits can be expressed as a function of the firm’s sales, its markup, and parameters:
pir =
[
1
σr
(
1− σr − 1
α(σg − 1)
)]
I∑
i=1
sriXi (4.14)
Note that weakly positive profits for all firms requires that α > σr−1
σg−1 . Since σr ≤ σg, this
condition only requires that the stocking cost not exhibit large increasing returns to scale in
the size of the product line. It is always satisfied if the marginal cost of adding a product is
constant or increasing.
4.3 Market Clearing
Goods and labor markets clear. Household expenditure Xi is divided across grocery and non-
grocery goods according to their Cobb-Douglas utility shares β and 1 − β. Goods market
clearing in each city implies that
Yi = (1− β)Xi (4.15)
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and
PiCi = µXi (4.16)
Households supply labor inelastically. Labor demand associated with the production of
non-grocery and grocery goods (the price of non-grocery goods is the numeraire) is given by
LYi =
Yi
ai
(4.17)
and
LGi =
Ci
ai
. (4.18)
Finally, there is labor demand associated with the stocking costs paid by retailers (not
associated with one particular market):
LF =
∑
r F (nr)
ai
(4.19)
Goods are freely tradable, so labor market clearing requires only that all labor be employed
at a local wage wi = ai. Because the marginal value product of labor is equalized across
cities, the location of production for each good type is indeterminate. Total labor market
demand across all cities must equal total labor supply:
∑
i
(
LYi + LGi
)
+ LF =
∑
i
Li. (4.20)
I assume that the share of total profits rebated to consumers in city i are both given by
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spii . For simplicity, I assume that spii is proportional to the city’s share of labor income:
spii =
wiLi∑
j wjLj
. (4.21)
As a result of this assumption, total expenditure in city i is a constant multiple of labor
income across cities
Xi =
(
1 +
∑
r pir∑
j wjLj
)
wiLi. (4.22)
4.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is a set of retailer product lines and bundle prices {nri, Pri}i∈I,r∈R,
city-level grocery and factor prices {Pi, wi}i∈I , local labor allocations {LYi , LGi , LFi }i∈I , local
goods production {Ci, Yi}i∈I , and total profits per retailer {pir}r∈R. Consumers maximize
utility over consumption of grocery and non-grocery goods and allocate grocery consumption
across retailers as specified in equations (4.1) and (4.2). Retailers maximize profits choosing
product lines and a markup according to equations (4.7) and (4.8).
The retailer-city price level and the overall grocery price for each city are defined in
equations (4.5) and (4.6). Local output and labor markets satisfy equations (4.15), (4.18)
and (4.20).
4.5 Business Cycle Interpretation
In order to understand how the decisions of retailers can transmit productivity shocks across
cities, I compare equilibria under a set of city-level productivities ai,t−1 and ai,t. It is conve-
nient to compare steady states in terms of log changes, where xˆ = dlogx. In this analysis, I
assume that tastes are constant over time: γˆri = 0.
I focus on the impact of city-level shocks {aˆi}i∈I on the length of an arbitrary retailer’s
product line and markup and therefore on consumer welfare. First, log-linearizing equation
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(4.13) gives an expression for the change in product line length:
nˆr =
1
α
Xˆr + nˆc, (4.23)
where the second term nˆc accommodates trend growth in the number of products for each
retailer category.
Transforming equation (4.5), the change in the retailer’s global price is given by
Pˆr =
1
1− σg nˆr +
ˆ¯mc. (4.24)
The growth in the price set by each retailer in each city incorporates the cost term τi, which
enters through nˆri:
Pˆr =
1
1− σg nˆri +
ˆ¯mc. (4.25)
Note that because wi = ai in every city, ˆ¯mc = 0 in general. Combining these expressions,
the change in the retailer’s price can be expressed as a function of parameters and its own
demand:
Pˆri =
1
1− σg
1
α
Xˆr +
1
1− σg (nˆc + τˆi) (4.26)
Log-linearizing the city grocery price level Pi in equation (4.6) gives
Pˆi =
∑
r
sriPˆri. (4.27)
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4.6 City-Level Contributions to Retailer Variety
In order to understand how shocks to ai may be transmitted to other cities through changes
in the set of available products, I decompose the change in the retailer price Pˆr into contri-
butions coming from each city in which the retailer operates. I denote the impact of demand
in city j on retailer r’s price level by Tˆrj. The full impact of demand in city j on city i’s
price level is a weighted sum of each contribution Tˆrj, where the weights are the share of
retailer r in city i’s expenditure. I describe the derivation of the expression for the impact
of city j on city i’s demand, denoted Tˆij, in what follows.
Equations (4.23) and (4.24) describes the relationship between changes in total retailer
revenue Xˆr, changes in the length of the product line nˆr and changes in the global price of
the retailer Pˆr. I begin by decomposing this relationship into a contribution coming from
each city in which the retailer operates. The share ωri of retailer r’s revenue derived from
each city i is
ωri =
sriXi∑
i sriXi
. (4.28)
Retailer revenue growth can be expressed as the inner product of retailer-city revenue
shares and city expenditure growth:
Xˆr =
∑
i
ωriXˆi. (4.29)
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Combining equations (4.23) and (4.24), the retailer price level is:11
Pˆr =
1
1− σg
1
α
Xˆr +
1
1− σg nˆc (4.30)
I use equation (4.29) to decompose equation (4.30) into the contribution of each city j to
the change in retailer r’s price, denoting this contribution by Tˆrj:
Pˆr =
∑
j
ωriTˆrj (4.31)
where the contribution of city j to the change in the price level of retailer r is given by
Tˆrj =
1
1− σg
1
α
Xˆj +
1
1− σg nˆc. (4.32)
The contribution of demand growth in city j to the price level in city i can be expressed as
the sum of city j’s contributions Tˆrj to retailers in set Rij, weighted by the share sri of each
retailer in city i’s demand. I denote the total contribution of city j to city i’s price level
by Tˆij. Combining equation (4.27) with equations (4.31) and (4.32), the change in the price
level in city i due to contributions to each retailer’s price from city j is given by
Tˆij =
∑
r∈Rij
sriωrjTˆrj. (4.33)
Finally, combining equation (4.32) with equation (4.33), the connection between demand
in city j and city i’s price level is given by:12
11Note that this is almost equivalent to equation (4.26), omitting city-level differences in the retailer’s
price due to the term τi, which is unrelated to the retailer’s choice of product line.
12Because
∑
j ωrj = 1, the contribution of each city to trend growth nˆccan be divided proportionally
across cities.
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Tˆij =
1
1− σg
∑
r∈Rij
sriωrj
( 1
α
Xˆj + nˆc
)
(4.34)
Equation (4.34) expresses an intuitive relationship between demand in city pairs. City j
has a larger impact on price level changes in city i whenever common retailers Rij represent
a large fraction of consumption in city i (sri is large), these retailers derive a significant
fraction of their revenue from city j (ωrj is large), or demand shocks in city j are particularly
significant (Xˆj is large).
5 Calibrated Model
The model links demand shocks in each city to consumer welfare gains from new products
through the shares {sri, ωri}, two key parameters α and σg, the cost parameter τi and the
trend growth in varieties nˆc specific to each category of food retailer. In this section, I
describe how I choose each parameter.
5.1 Retailer-City Shares
The shares of each city-retailer in city-level expenditure, sri, and retailer revenue shares, ωri,
are taken from data. I begin by characterising the relationship between cities implied by
these shares. As equation (4.34) suggests, city j has a larger impact on city i’s price level
when retailers in the set Rij make up a large share of city i’s expenditure and when city j
is a significant source of revenue for those retailers. The ‘common retailer share’ of city j
in city i can be expressed as the sum of these shares, denoted Sij =
∑
r∈Rij sriωrj, reflecting
the share of common retailers in city i’s demand. Denote Si =
∑
j 6=i Sij, the common share
between city i and all other cities.
Table I.6 characterises both the bilateral common retailer shares Sij as well as the overall
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Table I.6: Common Retailer Shares: City Pairs and Total
City Pairs All Other Cities
Sij Si
Share Share
Maximum Maximum
San Diego-LA 63 Columbus 91
Pittsburgh-Cleveland 37 Baltimore 88
Minimum Minimum
Boston-Louisville <0.1 Chicago 25
Seattle-Louisville <0.1 Boston 18
Mean 2 Mean 63
Notes: The table reports extremes of the distribution of city-level common retailer shares Sij in
the first column and the sum over all other cities j in the second. Note that Sij 6= Sji.
common retailer share between each city and all others, Si. The first column characterises
common retailer shares across city pairs. Not surprisingly, small cities tend to have large
common retailer shares with large neighbors: L.A.’s share of revenue in retailers available to
consumers in San Diego is 63 percent. Bilateral ties between small cities in distant regions are
virtually non-existent. While the fact that the bilateral share between San Diego and Boston
is small is intuitive, it is somewhat surprising that this bilateral connection is so close to
zero given the presence of several national retailers in the data. It appears that expenditures
at national retailers are not large enough to create strong bilateral connections: the average
bilateral connection is 2 percent.
The second column characterizes the common retailer share between city i and all other
cities. Consumers in small cities, particularly those geographically close to major metros,
conduct most grocery purchases at retailers they share with other cities. At the highest
extreme, the total common retailer share between Columbus and all other cities is 91 percent.
Similarly large linkages can be seen in Baltimore. Chicago and Boston have strikingly low
common retailer shares: these markets are large enough and isolated enough that outside
cities contribute little to the revenue of retailers operating in these two cities. Boston is the
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most extreme, with a total common retailer share of just 18 percent.
Looking only at the extremes of the bilateral share distribution may give the impression
that geography explains the degree to which two cities are connected. However, while some
logical geographic patterns exist, strong common retailer shares are not restricted to cities in
the same geographic region. I define regions based on Census divisions.13 Table I.7 describes
the share of all linkages accounted for by cities within and outside city i’s region according
the expression
si,Dx =
∑
j∈Dx
∑
r
sriωrj.
The common share of each city with other cities in the same region is generally high.
However, the table also reports the region other than city i’s own that accounts for the
largest share of shock transmission. For example, cities in the West Coast region have their
highest common share with other cities in the region, at 80 percent. Their highest outside
common retailer share with another region is 7 percent with the Mountain region. Similarly,
the Northeast has a high within-region common retailer share at 73 percent. Its largest
common retailer share with another region is 14 percent with the Midwest. Other regions
feature stronger links with cities in other regions. Texas accounts for just 54 percent of
its own retailers’ revenue with strong connections to the Midwest, and the common retailer
share of Texas cities in the Midwest is similarly large.
5.2 Parameters
Next, I describe how the values of the fixed cost parameter α from equation (4.12), elasticity
of substitution across goods σg, cost parameter τi and trend growth rate of product varietynˆc
are chosen.
13I combine the New England and Mid Atlantic divisions and separate Tampa, Miami and Orlando from
the rest of the South Atlantic division. For clarity, I refer to the South Central division as Texas because
the cities representent in the data are Dallas and Houston.
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Table I.7: Common Retailer Shares by Region
Region i si,Di Region j si,Dj
West Coast 80 Mountain 7
Northeast 73 Midwest 14
Mountain 71 West Coast 18
Florida 64 Northeast 13
South 62 Northeast 9
Texas 54 Midwest 22
Midwest 47 Texas 25
Notes: The table reports the share of all common retailer links accounted for by other cities in the region (first two columns)
and by cities in the outside region with the largest common retailer share (last two columns).
Equation (4.23) demonstrates that the shape parameter of the cost function, α, also
governs the elasticity of growth in the product line to growth in the retailer’s demand. In
practice, changes in the value of new products offered by each retailer are better predicted
by one year lagged than contemporaneous expenditure growth. As in section 3.3, I use the
weighted average growth in a retailer’s markets as an instrument for exogenous growth in
the retailer’s revenue:
Zˆrt =
∑
i
ωritXˆit (5.1)
Xˆr,t−1 = γ0 + γ1Zˆr,t−1 + uri,t (5.2)
nˆri,t = β1Xˆr,t−1 + β2(1− LANY Ci) + Γc + ri,t (5.3)
The coefficients β1 can be interpreted as β1 = 1α . Note that I allow for a set of category-
specific trend growth rates of product variety Γc corresponding to the parameter nˆc. I
estimate an elasticity of new products to retailer revenue of 0.16, implying a stocking cost
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Table I.8: Parameter Calibration Regression
nˆri,t Associated Parameter Value
β1 .155 α 6.46
(.011) (.45)
β2 -.007 τˆ -.007
(.001) (.001)
Number of Obs 2,007
Retailers 70
R2 0.39
Note: The table reports the results of regression equation (5.3), which is used to calibrate
parameters α and τˆ .
shape parameter α = 6.46. Because this elasticity is less than one, the retailer’s marginal
cost of supplying additional products F (nr) increases with the number of products offered.
I allow for a difference in the trend growth of new products between the two largest cities
in the sample, New York and Los Angeles, and all other cities, given by the indicator variable
LANY Ci. This trend difference τˆ implies that all other cities experience new product entry
that is 0.7 percentage points lower. Importantly, this is not driven by particularly high
demand in New York and Los Angeles, but rather by the fact that some retailers appear
to offer a slightly longer product line in large cities. Note that this is one parameter, not a
trend adjustment specific to each city.
To avoid the bias associated with macroelasticities highlighted by Imbs and Mejean
(2015), I choose an elasticity to match the average welfare gains calculated using the mi-
croelasticities in Appendix Table A.1 rather than calculating a macro elasticity pooling all
goods. To do so, I regress the model-predicted change in product variety in each city, nˆi,t,
on the microestimates reported in Section 3.1. I estimate a value of σg of 4.09. The elas-
ticity of substitution σg governs the welfare impact of new products. Parameter values are
summarized in Table I.9.
To evaluate the model’s predictions, I use the calibration of the parameters in equations
(4.26) and (4.27) to predict city-level welfare gains based on demand growth in each city. I
compare the model’s predictions to the welfare gains calculated in section 3.1 using microdata
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Table I.9: Parameter Values in Baseline Calibration
Value
Expenditure and Revenue Shares {sri, ωri} Table I.6
City Trend Growth Adjustment τˆ -.007 (.001)
Goods Elasticity of Substitution σg 4.09 (.03)
Stocking Cost Shape Parameter α 6.46(.45)
Notes: The table summarizes the parameter values used in the calibration. The distribution of
shares, which implicitly defines γri, was discussed previously.
Figure 5.1: Baseline Model Predicted Welfare Gains vs. Microdata-Based Welfare Gains
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Notes: The figure compares the prediction of the calibrated model to the welfare gains estimated
using UPC-level microdata for each retailer.
at the UPC level. The predictions of the model are plotted against the gains based on micro
data in Figure 5.1. Within the period 2008-2010, the correlation between the baseline model
and the microdata estimate is 0.75, while within the period 2011-2014 it is 0.85. Overall,
the correlation between the baseline model and the microdata estimates is 0.92.
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6 Decomposing Welfare Gains into City-level Contri-
butions
6.1 City-level Shocks in the Baseline Model
The model implies that demand shocks in other cities impact consumer welfare through the
product selection decisions of common retailers. I return to the decomposition in equations
(4.29) and (4.32) and calculate the implied contribution of each city to consumer welfare in
other cities in the baseline model. The contribution of city j to city i ’s price level can be
expressed as
Tˆij =
1
1− σg
∑
r∈Rij
sriωrj
( 1
α
Xˆj + nˆc
)
(6.1)
Table I.10 reports the results for the average city as well as two particular examples:
other cities account for 63 percent of welfare gains in the average city (this share exceeds 50
percent in part because the largest cities in the sample are much larger than the average).
The average city receives welfare gains of 1.5 percentage points from its own demand shocks
between 2008-2010 and 1.8 percentage points from 2011-2014. Welfare gains derived from
outside shocks are larger at 2.8 and 3.6 percentage points respectively. The table also reports
the contribution of own and outside demand shocks for two cities on opposite extremes:
Boston and Columbus. Not surprisingly, Boston, which has very low connections to other
cities through retailers, inherits little of its welfare gains from other cities. Columbus, which
is highly integrated with other Midwestern cities, derives almost all its welfare gains from
other cities.
Next, I ask whether welfare shock transmission results from intra-regional shocks: in other
words, whether understanding regional outcomes is sufficient to predict city-level welfare.
Table I.11 reports the share of welfare gains coming from cities in the same region and the
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Table I.10: Contribution of Own and Outside Shocks to Welfare Gains
2008-2010 2011-2014
Outside Share Own Shocks Outside Shocks Own Shocks Outside Shocks
Average City 0.63 1.5 2.8 1.8 3.6
Boston 0.09 3.3 0.9 3.9 1.2
Columbus 0.91 0.4 4.0 0.5 4.7
Table I.11: Contribution of Intra- and Cross-Regional Shocks to Welfare Gains
Region Gains Largest Outside Region Gains
West Coast 75 Mountain 7
Northeast 70 Midwest 14
Mountain 66 West Coast 18
South 58 Northeast 10
Florida 54 Northeast 15
Texas 49 Midwest 22
Midwest 44 Texas 24
Notes: The table records the average across cities in each region of the share of welfare gains
attributable to cities within and outside its own region.
outside region that makes the largest contribution. While regional shocks account for a
substantial share of welfare gains, consumers in Florida, the South, Texas and the Midwest
derive a substantial fraction of their gains from new products from demand shocks in other
regions.
Large welfare gains from outside shocks can be generated two ways: if one city has an
unusually large shock, it transmits some welfare gains (or losses) even to cities with which
it has few common retailers. On the other hand, shock transmission may be the result
not of a significantly large shock in some locations, but of large connections between cities
through common retailers that account for a significant share of demand. I decompose the
relationship further to explore whether the large contribution of outside cities is attributable
to large shocks or to large retailer connections.
Define the total common retailer share between city i and city j as Sij =
∑
Rij sriωri. The
contribution of city j to city i’s price level can be expressed as the impact of variation in
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Table I.12: Contribution of Shocks and Shares to Demand Shock Transmission
Tij Shocks Shares Covariance
Partial R2 0.04 0.86 0.11
Standard Deviation (pp) 0.67 0.17 0.64 0.23
Notes: The table records the share of variation orthogonal to other variables that can be
explained by each component of equation (I.12).
demand shocks Xj across locations, the impact of variation in shares Sij, and an expression
closely related to the covariance between these two:
Tij =
1
1− σg
1
α
S¯iXj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shocks
+ SijX¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shares
− S¯ijX¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Avg
+ (Sij − S¯i)(Xj − X¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Covariance
 . (6.2)
The average S¯i is defined at the city level to accommodate the fact that cities vary
significantly in their degree of integration:
S¯i =
1
J
∑
j 6=i
Sij. (6.3)
The average X¯ is the average demand shock across cities
X¯ = 1
J
∑
j
Xˆj. (6.4)
The results of the decomposition are reported in Table I.12. Differences in shares or-
thogonal to other factors account for 86 percent of the variation in total welfare gains from
outside cities, while the covariance term accounts for 11 percent of the variation. Variation
in shocks accounts for just 3 percent of the variation. The intuition is clear after looking
at the amount of variation in the three terms: the standard deviations of the share and
covariance terms are significantly greater than the standard deviation of the shock term.
The results indicate the importance of inter-city common retailer shares in explaining
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transmission of shocks. Though demand shocks range from -2.4 to 27 percent, the average
inter-city share is just 2 percent. With such a low common retailer share between i and j,
there will be relatively low transmission even of a large demand shock. Shock transmission
occurs primarily between the city pairs that have larger common retailer shares.
6.2 Counterfactuals
For a given business cycle, a city may benefit or suffer from its connection with other cities.
If a city receives a better shock than its neighbor, their common retailers offer fewer products
than had both cities experienced the better shock. The converse is also true. However, the
transmission of shocks across cities unambiguously decreases the variation in welfare gains
if idiosyncratic business cycle shocks are random across cities.
To understand how much smoothing of welfare gains from new variety is generated by
existing multi-city retailers, I compare the predictions of the baseline model to the predicted
welfare gains under three counterfactual retailer distributions. At one extreme, I conduct a
‘local’ counterfactual in which all retailers are local: i.e., setting ωri = 1. In this counterfac-
tual, new product entry will only respond to local demand shocks. At the other extreme, I
consider a counterfactual in which retailers are all national, i.e., ωri = Xi∑
j∈I Xj
∀r. In this
case, even though local shocks vary, this city-level variation will be smoothed out within each
retailer, and new product entry will respond only to aggregate demand. Finally, I consider a
counterfactual in which retailers operate in only in one region, i.e. ωri = Xi∑
j∈Di
Xj
if r ∈ RDi .
The results reported in Table I.11 suggest that the welfare gains experienced by cities in
most regions are primarily driven by demand growth within the same region, although there
are significant retailer connections between some cities that are geographically distant.
Table I.13 reports the standard deviation of demand growth and welfare gains across cities
in the periods 2008-2010 and 2011-2014. Demand growth was more variable in the recovery
period, so the standard deviation of welfare is higher in this period. Because retailers in
all cities are exposed to the same demand shock under the national counterfactual, the
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Table I.13: Baseline and Counterfactual Models: Standard Deviation of Welfare Gains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Xˆi Baseline Local Variety Regional Variety National Variety
2008-2010 4.85 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.00
2011-2014 5.61 0.19 0.28 0.16 0.00
Notes: The table reports the standard deviation of demand shocks and the standard de-
viation of business cycle product entry in the baseline model, local, regional and national
counterfactuals.
standard deviation of business cycle welfare gains is zero in this scenario. In both periods,
the standard deviation of welfare gains from demand shocks across cities under the baseline
distribution of retailers is about 68 percent of the standard deviations when retailers are
local. While the existence of multi-city retailers appears to result in smoother welfare gains
across cities, the baseline model suggests that the fact that most retailers are regional rather
than national results in much more variable welfare gains from product variety than would
result from national retailers. Indeed, the standard deviation of welfare gains in the regional
counterfactual is quite similar to that of the baseline model.
7 Conclusion
This paper documents a novel channel through which business cycle shocks are transferred
across locations. While previous work has shown that booms are associated with entry of
new products at the national level, entry of new products across cities is not well-explained
by local business cycles. If consumers value variety, entry of new products effectively lowers
the consumer price level, raising the real wage.
The welfare implications of local changes in product variety are relatively large: from
2008-2010, the average city experienced welfare gains ranging from 3.9 to 5.7 percentage
points, and they experienced gains of 4.7 to 6.7 percentage points in 2011-2014. I present
evidence that the welfare gains associate with net product entry are driven by retailers
who operate in multiple markets and coordinate product entry across markets. The role of
retailers in explaining product entry motivates a model in which multi-city retailers choose
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how many products to sell to maximize their profits subject to an increasing cost of extending
the product line.
I use the model to decompose the welfare gains in each city into a contribution coming
from each other city in the data. The model implies that consumers in the average city derive
63 percent of welfare gains from demand in other cities. The transmission of shocks acts as
a mechanism through which the idiosyncratic component of business cycle shocks may be
‘smoothed’ across cities. However, comparison of the level of inter-city variation in welfare
gains under the basline and counterfactuals in which variety is determined purely locally or
at the aggregate level suggest that the predominance of regional rather than national retailers
results in substantially higher variation in consumer welfare than under full product market
integration.
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Chapter II: New Exporter Growth
and Sequential Entry
1 Introduction
New exporters start out small and grow to meet average total export sales over a multi-
year period. The period of growth suggests that firms face frictions that prevent them from
reaching their full potential export sales immediately. Previous work such as Ruhl and Willis
(2017) has represented the growth of new exporters as a falling marginal cost of serving a
foreign market, either the result of a random process or investment decisions by the exporting
firm. Because the friction affects the intensive margin of trade in these models, it depresses
export sales for all new exporters, regardless of their productivity.
I show that much of new exporter growth is actually explained by sequential entry into
new foreign markets, and that as the result of this market entry strategy, policies which aim
to help new exporters grow should focus on helping firms overcome entry costs. Moreover,
I show that the immediate bilateral benefit of reducing entry costs is significantly lower
than the full benefit, which takes into account long-run bilateral effects as well as potential
effects on other export markets. I begin using Colombian customs data from 2007 to 2012
to document novel patterns in the behavior of new exporters that suggest a pattern of
sequential market entry by exporting firms in the face of extensive margin friction. I then
build a quantitative model of the exporter’s market entry decision that allows me to evaluate
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the consequences of trade policy aimed at reducing these frictions. The model illustrates
that empirical evaluations of the effect of trade policy ignore a substantial fraction of the
total effect of such policy.
These data allow me to document four findings. First, although new exporters take a
few years to reach average total exports, the value of their exports to an individual foreign
market is surprisingly similar to that of older exporters: new exporters actually exceed
average sales per market within the first two years. Second, new exporters sell to fewer-
than-average markets, even after five years of continuous exporting. Third, conditional on
entry, newer exporters are more likely to enter one of the largest export markets for Colombia,
while older exporters enter less popular markets, suggesting that firms begin with the largest
markets and enter successively more difficult markets over the life cycle. The choice of export
location and export product conform to the pattern demonstrated in Eaton, Kortum and
Kramarz (2011): new exporters typically enter the top-ranked markets based on sales of
all Colombian exporters. New exporters who survive export to new destinations over time,
resulting in growth in total sales over the first five years of export. In contrast, experienced
exporters who enter a new destination have lower sales, and are less likely to enter a top
export destination. Fourth, I show that the entry hazard rises with the number of countries
served by an exporter, suggesting that export experience creates efficiencies in other export
markets.
It is well known that trade policies targeting the intensive and extensive margin of export
will have different effects on the value of trade and the characteristics of domestic firms who
are able to export after the policy. In order to understand how a trade policy aimed at
encouraging the growth of new exporters might affect the behavior of firms who engage in
sequential exporting, I build a model that captures my findings about exporter behavior. I
assume that firms are constrained to enter markets sequentially and that the entry cost for
any market falls in the number of foreign markets already served by the exporter. In this
framework, exporters will choose to enter markets in order of decreasing profitability. Firms
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will enter markets that were not profitable to enter in the first year of export during later
periods as their export experience reduces the cost of entry facing some constant probability
that their export spell ends before they have entered all profitable markets.
The model is parsimonious in the number of parameters. Most important are the esti-
mated size and fixed cost of each market and the shape of the distribution of firm produc-
tivity. In bringing the model to the data, I construct measures of relative market size based
on average exports in each market and distributional assumptions on firm productivity. The
steady state of the model offers clean relationships between moments of the distribution of
firm sales and parameters of the model. Most parameter values come directly from moments
of the export data. However, the elasticity of substitution across goods, which determines
the correspondance between the distribution of firm sales and firm productivity, is difficult to
calculate with this data. I adopt a commonly used value from Broda and Weinstein (2006).
I compare the predictions of the model to key findings such as the patterns of new exporter
growth and the correlation between entry rank in the data and as predicted by the model.
I use the calibrated model to predict the effect of reductions in the cost of entry for each
foreign market one-by-one. I demonstrate that the potential benefits are large and different
from those assumed by many empirical studies. It is common when evaluating empirical
instances of export promotion to consider a bilateral effect over a short time frame. The
model suggests that in addition to the bilateral change in market sales coming from a change
in entry costs, there may be significant ‘multilateral’ effects on entry into other markets.
Because firms adopt a sequential market entry strategy, the multilateral effect of a reduction
in entry costs may not be fully realized in the first year after the change.
The multilateral effect can be positive or negative depending on whether the entry cost
reduction increases or decreases the probability that an exporter sells to other markets. For
example, consider an initial scenario in which an exporter will only export to Chile if it
has first exported to Mexico. A reduction in entry costs to Chile could reverse the order
in which the exporter enters these markets. It will now be less costly to enter Mexico
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because exporters have more export experience before attempting entry, meaning that lower
productivity exporters will be able to enter Mexico. This will boost total exports to Mexico.
However, deferring entry into an already profitable market means that some firms will be
forced to terminate their export spell before they have the opportunity to export to Mexico.
This will decrease total exports to Mexico. The total effect will depend on parameter values
and market sizes. Estimates based on the model suggest that the net benefit of reducing
entry costs may be as high as $336.6 million dollars per year for Venezuela (the market served
by the most exporters with $2.9 billion in total exports per year) or as low as $4.6 million
per year for Guatemala (the ninth largest export market with $311 million in total exports
per year). The benefit to reducing entry costs to Guatemala is so low in part because the
multilateral effect, which delays entry into Mexico and the Dominican Republic, is a loss of
$9 million. For Mexico, the multilateral effect is positive: the increase in entry into Costa
Rica and Peru conveys a benefit of $8.3 million.
The insights of the model contribute to a literature evaluating the impact of state ex-
port promotion activities on outcomes for exporting firms. Bernard and Jensen (2004) find
no effect from state subsidies to exporting in the US, while evidence from Spain, Peru, and
Uruguay suggests that increase their activity on the extensive margin in response to receiving
export assistance (Gil-Pareja et al. 2008, Volpe Martincus and Caballo 2008, 2010). Other
work has evaluated the pro-trade impact of less direct export promotion activities: perma-
nent diplomatic missions (Rose 2011), visits by heads of state (Nitsch 2007), and formal
trade missions (Head and Ries 2010). The modal result is that under plausible identification
strategies, bilateral trade policies have modest or no effects on trade in the year immedi-
ately following implementation of the trade policy. Broad export promotion organizations
of the type studied by Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010) provide modest increases in the
number of countries and products served by the exporter over the short term. These studies
generally do not ask whether there might be persistent multilateral effects of trade policy.
My findings suggest that when exporters enter markets sequentially, the long-term benefit
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is likely to exceed immediate gains from trade policy. Efficiencies in overcoming entry costs
may lead exporters to add more than one new market as the result of purely bilateral trade
promotion activities, but this multilateral effect will likely not appear immediately after a
trade promotion policy is implemented.
My approach is most similar to the ‘testing the waters’ model of Albornoz et al. (2012)
and the extended gravity model in Morales, Sheu and Zahler (2017). They show that under
linear demand and uncertainty about profitability, firms may choose to start out by exporting
a small quantity to the destination(s) with highest expected demand, entering additional
markets after the uncertainty is resolved. The strongest evidence for the ‘testing the waters’
hypothesis comes from the particularly high growth rate of sales between year 1 and year 2,
but Bernard et al. (2017) have shown that correcting for the partial year problem drastically
reduces the growth rate of export sales. I build on the intuition of their paper by showing that
in the presence of dynamic entry costs, exporters may have a motive to export sequentially
even without reducing quantities exported in the first year. The approach to rationalizing
sequential entry through falling entry costs echoes the intuition of Morales et al. (2017), who
argue that there are entry cost efficiencies in exporting to markets with similar characteristics.
While my findings and modelling assumptions are broadly consistent with the existence of
extended gravity, I present evidence that the tendency of firms to export to markets in the
same region can be rationalized through the concentration of demand for specific goods types
in geographic regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Colombian export
data used in the paper. Section 3 presents new facts about new export growth based on
these data. Section 4 discusses the relationship between the state-dependent entry costs in
Morales et. al (2017) and my findings. Section 5 develops the theoretical framework, in
which entry costs decline in exporter experience, and shows that this simple model matches
key findings in the data. Section 6 calculates the effect of trade policy aimed at reducing
market-specific entry costs. Section 7 concludes.
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Table II.1: Annual Exporter Sales, Millions
Total Firm-Level Single Market
2007 13,680 1.74 0.29
2008 13.,700 1.76 0.30
2009 10,910 1.46 0.26
2010 10,930 1.66 0.27
2011 12,850 1.92 0.31
2012 13,100 1.91 0.31
2 Data
Colombian customs data come from the National Administrative Department of Statistics
of Colombia. They include the f.o.b. value in US dollars of all Colombian manufacturing
exports at the shipment level between 2007 and 2012 and reported quantities and weights
in kilograms. Data on shipping and insurance costs are sporadically reported. Shipments
are identified with the firm’s unique national identification number (NIT), an HS10 product
code, and the destination country and port.
In this paper, I focus on private manufacturing firms, which account for about 40 percent
of total Colombian exports. Sales of crude oil and coal account for almost half of Colombian
exports, but their sales are heavily influenced by world commodity pricing, which was par-
ticularly volatile during the period covered by the data. Furthermore, the state-controlled
firm Ecopetrol accounts for most of Colombian crude oil exports.1
Table II.1 describes total manufacturing exports, average total firm sales, and average
firm sales within individual markets (defined as an HS4 product-country pair) in millions
of US dollars. Total exports range from $10.9 to $13.7 billion per year. The average firm
exports about $1.75 million per year, with an average of $290 thousand per market. The
pattern of growth in Colombian exports in my sub-sample of the data is consistent with
Colombian national statistics: the trough of exports occurs in 2009. The trade collapse
1The Ecopetrol petroleum company, one of the largest Colombian exporters, launched an IPO in late
2007. The bulk of the company’s stock continues to be held by the Colombian government and government
officials represent about half of its board of directors.
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Table II.2: Number of Firms by Type, 2008-2012
Type of Firm
All Exp. Non-Entrant Exp. Entrant New Exporter
2008 46013 41353 1283 241
2009 42674 36447 1283 241
2010 39926 33617 1283 241
2011 4612 33664 1283 241
2012 42712 33139 1283 241
looks relatively mild in Colombia: total exports fall by 14 percent.
In order to study the behavior of new exporters in the data, I establish the following
definitions. I refer to an exporter that does not export in 2007 as a new exporter. For
consistency with the literature, I focus particularly on new exporters that survive for five
years, i.e., that export every year from 2008 to 2012. Of course, some firms that I define as
new exporters could be firms that exported in the years before 2007. I evaluate the likelihood
that this occurs by applying the same definitions shifted forward one year: new exporters are
those that export in 2009 but not 2008. Since I have the data from two years earlier for these
firms, I am able to calculate how many of these firms actually exported in 2007. I find that 7
percent of firms and 12 percent of firm-product-destination observations are misclassified as
new exporters. Given that 2008-2009 represents the trough of the US recession, the amount
of misclassification between 2007-2008 is probably lower since there is likely to have been
less firm exit.
Among market entrants, I distinguish between new exporters and firms that already
export another product or ship to another country. I refer to totally new exporters as
‘new entrants’ and to firms that have export experience and are adding a new market as
‘experienced entrants’. I refer to existing exporters who do not add a new market in 2008 as
‘experienced non-entrants’.
Based on these definitions, I am able to observe new firms for their first five years of
export and incumbent firms for six. Ruhl and Willis (2017) find that about 90 percent of
firms that have exported for five years survive to their sixth, suggesting that the panel is
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long enough to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful entrants. Table II.2 shows
the number of firms of each type, as well as the total number of firms.
In the main analysis, I collapse export sales to the total in each year for each firm-
destination country-HS4 and drop observations with total sales less than $1,000. The ad-
vantage of aggregating sales to the HS4 level is that products in different HS4 categories are
likely to be clearly distinct goods in consumption (e.g. 6101, men’s and boys’ coats vs. 6103,
men’s and boys’ suits). I assume that entry decisions for each product are independent even
in multiproduct firms. The validity of this assumption is likely to vary across broad product
types, but defining products at the HS2 or HS6 level generates similar results.
3 Empirical Findings
In this section, I start by showing that the data reproduce the growth pattern in Ruhl
and Willis (2017): average total sales for new exporters take about five years to reach the
average for all firms. I then document four stylized facts about new exporter growth: (1)
new exporter sales are similar to the average in markets in which they are active, but they
(2) enter different countries and (3) participate in fewer markets than more experienced
exporters. Finally, (4) the probability that an exporter enters a new market increases in the
number of markets served, even after accounting for differences in firm productivity. Taken
together, these findings suggests that the extensive margin, not the intensive, must drive
growth over the first five years of exporting.
I begin by demonstrating that new exporters in the data exhibit low total sales over a
period of five years. The analysis concentrates on firms that enter a new market in 2008
and survive in that market for the five years over which I can observe them. New entering
firms in 2008 reach the average total export sales of all exporters slightly less than five years
after entry. Figure 3.1 shows the growth in average total sales and the average total export
sales of all exporters between 2007 and 2012. The data produces a pattern similar to the
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Figure 3.1: Average Total Sales by Export Experience
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well-known stylized fact in Ruhl and Willis (2017), which used an earlier panel of Colombian
export data. The authors express the export intensity as the ratio of export to domestic
sales. Because I am looking at export data only, I compare new exporter sales to the average
exporter sales over the sample.
3.1 High Single-Market Sales
Next, I turn to export sales in individual markets. Figure 3.2 compares sales for incumbents,
surviving new exporters, and the average firm. Both surviving incumbent exporters and
surviving new exporters exhibit growth during this period, but new exporters grow faster.
However, average sales of new exporters start out as high as sales of other firms, including
surviving incumbents, and grow to be about twice as large over the period. The high starting
sales of new exporters does not immediately suggest that these firms are more constrained
that the average exporter.
High sales by new entrants can be explained in two ways: it may be that surviving
entrants have significantly higher productivity than incumbents, or they may be entering
markets that are larger or growing relative to the average market. I regress log sales in each
market on indicators for whether the firm is considered a new exporter or is an experienced
exporter adding an additional market, interacted with the year of the observation. The
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Figure 3.2: Average Market Sales by Export Experience
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regression equation is as follows
logsalesicp,t = α0 +
5∑
i=1
αitNewi ∗ Y eart +
5∑
i=1
βitExperiencedi ∗ Y eart + ΓXcp,t + εicp,t
where ΓXcp,t represents an optional set of year t, country c and/or country-industryp
dummies (HS2 product codes correspond roughly to four-digit NAICS industries). These
additional covariates may be necessary to account for time trends in export sales and differ-
ences in market size across industries or countries. If high sales by new exporters stem from
high productivity, controlling for export destination or industry should have no effect on the
result. On the other hand, if high sales stem from market selection, comparing exporters in
the same market should clarify the result.
Table II.3 reports the results. Column (1) shows the results of the regression with year
fixed effects only. New exporter sales in the first year are similar to those of other firms,
growing to be almost double in five years. Experienced exporters who add a market actually
have significantly lower sales than other firms in the first year according to this specification,
eventually growing to about 72 percent larger. Columns (2) and (3) add destination and
HS4 product dummies, accounting for differences coming from market selection: new entrants
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Table II.3: Log Sales by Exporter Experience, 2008-2012
(1) (2) (3)
New Exporters
Year 1 0.286** 0.378*** -0.129
(0.128) (0.124) (0.109)
Year 2 0.931*** 0.991*** 0.523***
(0.126) (0.125) (0.111)
Year 3 1.158*** 1.163*** 0.658***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.111)
Year 4 1.211*** 1.222*** 0.704***
(0.129) (0.128) (0.116)
Year 5 1.111*** 1.131*** 0.588***
(0.131) (0.129) (0.116)
Experienced Exporters
Year 1 -0.198*** -0.113** -0.271***
(0.0526) (0.0514) (0.0501)
Year 2 0.300*** 0.352*** 0.233***
(0.0540) (0.0526) (0.0495)
Year 3 0.611*** 0.610*** 0.452***
(0.0545) (0.0533) (0.0493)
Year 4 0.767*** 0.771*** 0.601***
(0.0557) (0.0543) (0.0506)
Year 5 0.704*** 0.716*** 0.521***
(0.0556) (0.0544) (0.0517)
Fixed Effects Year Year, Dest Year, Dest, HS4
Observations 212,937 212,937 212,937
R-squared 0.005 0.052 0.368
Standard errors are clustered at the firm (NIT) level. ** signifies p<0.01, * signifies p<0.05
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may be over-represented in particular export markets. Allowing for differences in destination
produces very similar results, except that new entrants actually start out larger than the
average firm. The coefficients in column (4) do change significantly: new exporters still start
out close in size to other firms in the same market, but perhaps a little smaller (the coefficient
is significant at 90 percent), and grow to be 50 percent larger than the average. Experienced
entrants start out significantly smaller and growth to be similar in size to new exporters.
These results do not support the view that new exporters are significantly more constrained
on the intensive margin than incumbent exporters. Both new and incumbent exporters grow
over the sample period, but they do so at a similar rate. The fact that sales are higher than
average for these two groups of firms likely reflects the fact that most exporters do not export
continuously over a five or six year period; these firms are likely to be more productive.
Appendix Tables C.3 and C.4 show the results of the same regressions with products
defined at the HS2 or HS6 level respectively. The results are similar using more aggregated
products or more disaggregated products. In sum, the results of Table II.3 supports the
conclusion that successful new exporters have sales revenue comparable to that of the average
firm within their first year of export, generating the second stylized fact.
Finding 1: New entrants have similar sales to more experienced firms in indi-
vidual markets in which they participate.
If low total sales are to be explained by frictions on the intensive margin, Finding 1 presents
a puzzle. Low total sales combined with relatively high sales in individual markets suggests
that market selection may play a role. The second and third empirical findings provide
support for this hypothesis.
3.2 Low Market Participation
I now study market participation by new and existing exporters. Despite similar perfor-
mance in individual markets, new exporters start out with fewer markets than incumbent
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Table II.4: Exporter Markets in 2008
Countries Products Total Markets
All 2.8 3 5.9
(4.1) (4.5) (11.9)
Incumbent, No Entry 3.6 3.7 7.7
(4.7) (5.2) (13.9)
New Entrant 1.2 1.7 1.9
(0.9) (1.8) (2.3)
Incumbent, Entry 3.4 3.3 7.1
(4.6) (4.8) (13.3)
firms. Table II.4 displays the average number of destinations, products and total markets
(product-destination combinations) in which exporters participate in 2008, the year of entry
for the new exporters I follow. New, successful exporters export to fewer markets than the
average exporter. Experienced exporters appear to export to nearly twice as many product-
destination combinations as new entrants, though the associated standard errors are large.
Because market participation is lower, total export sales for the new exporter are lower
than average despite above-average sales in their active markets. This reconciles the appar-
ently conflicting pictures of new exporter performance in Figures 3.1 and : new exporters
select their best markets to enter first, explaining their strong single-market sales, but enter
fewer markets, resulting in lower total sales across all export markets.
Next, I evaluate how the number of active market this interpretation further using a
negative binomial regression of the number of markets in which exporters sell, with an
indicator for Newi ∗ Y eart as in Table II.3. Column (1) of Table II.5 reports the results for
the number of countries: new exporters sell in 81 percent fewer countries than other exporters
in the first year, and 54 percent fewer in the fifth year after entry. Column (2) reports that
new exporters sell 74 percent fewer products in the first year, and 46 percent fewer after
five years. Last, Column (3) reports that in terms of total markets (destination-product
pairs), new exporters sell in 122 percent fewer in the first year, and 84 percent fewer in the
fifth year. While the increase in the number of markets served between the first and fifth
years is statistically significant, the results of Table II.5suggest that new exporters are slow
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Table II.5: Number of Markets by Years after Entry
(1) (2) (3)
Countries Products Total Markets
New Exporters
Year 1 -0.813*** -0.738*** -1.221***
(0.0810) (0.0922) (0.0908)
Year 2 -0.511*** -0.362*** -0.678***
(0.0906) (0.104) (0.117)
Year 3 -0.585*** -0.314*** -0.720***
(0.0855) (0.114) (0.120)
Year 4 -0.511*** -0.396*** -0.732***
(0.0960) (0.0945) (0.121)
Year 5 -0.541*** -0.460*** -0.837***
(0.0886) (0.0848) (0.0917)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year
Observations 21,222 21,222 21,222
to add new countries and products, even after five years of export. Overall, new exporters
participate in fewer markets even five years after successful entry into exporting. The delay
is particularly remarkable since it has been shown that within active markets, surviving new
entrants have high sales.
Finding 2: New entrants participate in fewer markets than the average firm,
even after exporting for five years.
3.3 Market Selection
Finding 1 showed that new entrants have comparable sales to those of the average firm in
individual markets. At first look, experienced exporters who enter a new market actually
have smaller sales than completely new firms. At least part of this finding appeared to be
explained by market selection: new exporters and experienced entrants looked more similar
once destination-product differences in average sales were taken into account. This strongly
suggests that market selection plays a role in explaining the differences between new and
other exporters: if new exporters enter fewer markets, as Finding 2 showed, but these markets
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Table II.6: Market Selection
(1) (2)
Top Destinations Top HS2
New 0.176* -0.0689
(0.0822) (0.0827)
Experienced -0.281** -0.0803*
(0.0357) (0.0363)
Observations 46,013 46,013
tend to be the largest export markets for Colombia, it would explain how total export sales
could be low while individual market sales are high.
To demonstrate the role of market selection, I compare the probability that a new versus
and experienced exporter begins exporting to one of the most popular destinations in 2008.2
Overall, 80 percent of firms shipped to at least one of the top five export destinations in
2008. I also consider selection into the top product groups, focusing on the top five HS2
categories because the number of possible HS4 categories is much larger than the number of
possible export destinations.
Whether focused on top destinations or top products, the regression equation is given by
Pr(shiptotopfive)icp,year = β0 +β1NewEntranticp+β2ExperiencedEntranticp+εicp,y (3.1)
Column (1) of Table II.6 shows results of a probit regression of equation 3.1: the proba-
bility that a firm is active in a top five market on exporter experience in 2008. Because the
new and experienced entrant variables are 0/1, their coefficients reflect the probability that
the firm-product-destination is operating in a top five market conditional on being a new
or experienced entrant. New exporters are 17.6 percent more likely to participate in a top
destination. In other words, firms that begin their first export spell are particularly likely to
be selling to a top 5 destination country. Experienced entrants, who already participate in
2In 2008, Ecuador, the United States, Panama, Venezuela and Costa Rica were the most popular manu-
facturing export destinations in terms of number of exporters.
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some foreign markets in 2007, are 28 percent less likely to enter one of the top five destina-
tions in 2008, implying that they are often already active in these markets if it is profitable.
In fact, 92 percent of experienced entrants sell the same product to a top five destination.
Product market selection appears to be less relevant. Column (2) shows the result of a
regression on the probability of participating in a top 5 HS2 product market. New exporters
are as likely to do so as the average firm, while experienced entrants are 8 percent less
likely to be entering a top product market. The type of products a firm produces may
be a fundamental attribute of the firm, making the difference in the result for destination
selection and product selection somewhat expected. It is realistic to assume that a firm may
more easily be able to ship the same product line to a new country than to begin producing
a completely different type of good.
Finding 3: Experienced entrants are less likely to enter the most popular ex-
port destinations than are completely new exporters, suggesting that firms enter
markets sequentially, in order of decreasing profitability.
3.4 Sequential Exporting: Increasing Entry Hazard
Last, I document the probability that an exporter enters a new market as a function of
the number of foreign markets they exported to in the previous year. For this analysis, I
consider all exporters in the data who export for at least two consecutive years. I start by
documenting the basic relationship between the number of foreign markets served and the
entry hazard that appears in the data. I group exporters into eight bins based on the number
of markets served last period to ensure a large enough number of observations in each bin,
thereby smoothing out some noise in the entry hazard. Figure 3.3 plots the percentage of
exporters entering a new market in a given year by their years of export experience, both
unweighted and weighted by total sales in that year. In either case, the probability that a
firm enters a new destination in a given year rises with the number of markets already served
by the exporter. The weighted and unweighted entry hazards are relatively similar because
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Figure 3.3: Fraction of Exporters Entering New Markets by Number of Markets Served
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Note: I group the data into eight bins: 1 market, 2-3 markets, 4-5 markets, 6-8 markets,
9-11 markets, 12-15 markets, 16-20 markets, and greater than 20 markets. The smallest bin
contains 187 observations.
conditioning on the number of markets already selects toward the largest firms. It may be
somewhat surprising to note that the entry hazard continues to rise even for exporters who
already export to more than ten markets: the entry hazard for firms that already export to
about 30 markets is about 95 percent.
Striking though this empirical pattern may be, it is hard to draw conclusions about
whether entering one additional market would make it easier for an exporter to enter new
markets in the future. Underlying firm productivity could produce a correlation between the
number of export destinations served by a firm and that firm’s probability of entering new
markets. I address this question by comparing the firm’s total exports to the average total
exports for the markets it serves, given by
MktAvgExpit =
1
I
∑
k∈I
S¯kt
where I represents the set of export markets served by firm i and S¯kt denotes average
exports to market k in year t. I include this measure in a regression of a variable indicating
61
whether firm i enters a new market at time t on the log of the number of markets:
Entersit = β0 + β1log(Markets)it−1 + β2log(AvgExp) + log(MktAvgExp)it + δt + it (3.2)
I assume the effect of an additional year of exporting experience is log-linear, an assump-
tion that appears to be consistent with the shape of the relationship in Figure 3.3. Table II.7
records the results of estimating regression model equation (3.2). The unweighted regression
is reported in column (1): an increase in the number of markets served of one log point is as-
sociated with a 32 percent increase in the probability that the firm enters a new market that
year. Weighting observations by the firm’s lagged total export sales in column (2) decreases
the strength of that relationship slightly: an increase in the number of markets served of one
log point increases the probability of entering a new market by 27 percent. Because firms
that exported to more foreign destinations are likely to have higher average total sales, the
weighted regression likely weights the regression toward capturing the behavior of firms that
already export to multiple markets. However, the point estimate is only slightly smaller.
Adding year fixed effects in column (3) has a negligible effect on the estimated relationship:
the estimate increases to 28 percent.
In principle, autocorrelation in the probability of market entry within firms might be a
concern. In column (4), I run the full regression, accounting for firm sales relative to the
average firm in the markets it serves. As expected, contribution of markets served last year
to the probability of entry is smaller after accounting for a measure of productivity, but the
effect is slight. An increase in the number of markets served of one log point is associated
with a 27 percent increase in the probability of entry. While equation (3.2) may not succeed
in fully controlling for firm productivity, the results reported in Table II.7 provide some
evidence that there is a significant direct effect of market participation on the entry hazard.
The strong relationship between the number of markets to which the firm exports and
market entry suggests that entering new markets over time is part of the typical exporter
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Table II.7: Regression Results: Probability of Entering a New Market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Markets (log) 0.321 0.270 0.279 0.266 0.295
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Avg Firm Exports per market (log) -0.010 -0.020
(0.002) (0.003)
Avg. Exports, Same markets (log) -0.095 -0.064
(0.008) (0.010)
Total Sales Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
HS4 Fixed Effects
Number of Obs 17,688 17,688 17,688 17,688
R2 0.16 0.34 0.38 0.38
life cycle. This fact may be surprising because standard models of export behavior are static
and assume that exporters pay an entry cost to sell to all markets in which they expect to
be profitable at the same time. A decreasing cost of exporting over the life cycle of the firm
suggests that the firm’s decision to begin exporting should incorporate not only the expected
flow profits from the markets it enters initially, but also the flow profits from markets it will
expect to enter in the future.
4 Gravity and Sequential Exporting
In this section, I briefly discuss the relationship between my empirical findings and the
widely-cited findings of Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2017) that also suggest a pattern of
sequential exporting. The authors find evidence of what they term ‘extended gravity’ in the
behavior of exporting firms within the Chilean chemicals industry: firms that have recently
begun exporting are particularly likely to enter markets that share characteristics such as a
common border or language with the first set of export destinations the firm chose. Within
a structural model of the export decision, this pattern suggests significantly smaller fixed
costs to these destinations conditional on prior exporting. In principle, this mechanism could
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underlie and complement Findings 3 and 4, suggesting a specific reason why new exporters
might enter markets sequentially and selectively.
First, I note that export industries (thought of here as HS2 codes) concentrate in distinct
subsets of foreign markets. For example, Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats (HS Chapter
15) account for 51 percent of the value of manufacturing exports outside of Spanish-speaking
Latin America and 7 percent within. Within Latin America, trade of Vehicles (HS Chapter
87) account for 33 percent of manufacturing trade. Outside Latin America, this sector
accounts for less than 1 percent of trade. As a result of this geographic concentration in
exports, firms are almost guaranteed to export in a way that looks consistent with extended
gravity, but could also be the result of geographic correlation in demand for the exporter’s
good.
Without data on domestic sales, as in Morales et al. (2017), I cannot implement their
structural model on my data and derive specific estimates of the entry cost reduction from
extended gravity with and without controlling for industry. However, in order to test whether
the Colombian export data replicates their finding at least in reduced form, I calculate the
conditional probability that an exporter enters a new foreign market in the same geographic
region as a market to which it already exports. I calculate this conditional probabilty first
without controlling for industry, then with HS2 products as an industry control. Appendix
Table 1 gives the results of regressions giving the probability of adding a new market in
a destination group conditional on which groups were added in year 1. For simplicity, I
concentrate on Latin America, US-Canada, and the European Union and exclude all other
destinations. Without conditioning on industry, firms that already export to Latin America
or the EU are significantly more likely to enter a country in a region to which they already
export, conditional on adding at least one market. After conditioning on industry, the sign
reverses: exporters are if anything less likely to export to a new country in a region to which
they already sell.
In this data, extended gravity, or the idea that entry costs are lower when exporters
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already serve similar markets, does not appear to explain more of market selection than
what is captured by correlation between the top export industries in a region. These results
are not contradict the hypothesis that entry cost efficiencies of the type found in Morales
et al. (2017) exist for Colombian exporters, they merely indicate that the data does not
afford enough variation to disambiguate these two potential explanations. In the model that
follows, I incorporate the intuition that firms may face different costs of entry based on their
export experience, but I abstract from the idea that these efficiencies are particularly large
for markets with similar geographic characteristics.
5 A Model of Sequential Export Entry
I develop a model of the life cycle of exporters in order to understand the consequences of
sequential exporting for the behavior of exporters and the consequences of export promotion
policy. The model environment consists of a mass m of firms from the home country of
heterogeneous productivity, a fraction δ of which enter and exit exporting status each period,
that choose whether or not to export to a series of I foreign export markets trading off
expected profits against the cost of entry. Entry costs decline in export experience.
For simplicity, I assume that firms can only enter one market per period. As a result of
entry in prior periods, an exporter may eventually choose to enter a market that would not
have been profitable earlier in the firm’s export history. Firms face demand in each market
that depends on their productivity. I analyze the model in partial equilibrium: it is assumed
that the share of foreign consumption and domestic factor employment attributable to the
activity of exporters from the home country is small enough that general equilibrium effects
are negligible. I rule out a circumstance in which an exporter might enter a market in which
its total profits will be negative in order to reduce its entry costs to another market by
assuming that firms are myopic with respect to the source of the efficiency in entry costs.
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5.1 Exporters
Firms from the home country differ in productivity ν , distributed g(ν). In each year of
operation t, exporters can choose to enter (at most) one of I total export markets. Their
flow profits are pii(ν). In order to begin selling to market i, firms must pay a sunk entry cost
of Fi(Nt−1). Expected net profits for each destination are given by
E[pii(ν)] =
pii(ν)
δ
− Fi(Nt−1), (5.1)
where pii(ν) = 1Aiν
−1. Ai represents the size of market i, which is known before entry.
Entry costs are a function of the number of markets to which the firm exported last
period, Nt−1,
Fi(Nt−1) =
fi
Nt−1
. (5.2)
Firms that have not yet begun to export or choose not to sell to foreign markets operate
in the domestic market only, i.e. Nt−1 = 1. For each market, there is a productivity threshold
as a function of Nt−1 above which all firms will make positive profits in expectation:
νit(Nt−1) =
[
δfi
AiNt−1
] 1
−1
Given the entry constraint, firms will enter markets in order of highest profit net of fixed
cost. Firms will enter market i before market j whenever νit(Nt−1) > νjt(Nt−1). Markets
can be ranked and indexed in order of year of entry: A1
f1
> A2
f2
> ... > AI
fI
. The productivity
cutoff for market i can be simplified to
νi ≥
(
δfi
Aii
) 1
−1
. (5.3)
All exporters that survive to year i and meet the productivity threshold will enter market
i. Note that because entry is sequential, it may be that νi < νi−1, in which case all surviving
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firms that export to market i − 1 will enter market i.3 The binding export cutoff is the
maximum of the cutoff described in equation 5.3 for markets i− 1 and i:
ν∗i = max{νi, ν∗i−1}. (5.4)
5.2 Exports in Steady State
Because the same fraction δ of firms enter and exit export status every period, the model has
a steady state in which, absent any shocks, the number of exporters and the total volume
of sales to each market are constant. Given the decision rule for market entry in equations
(5.3) and (5.4), total export sales to market i are given by
TSi = m(1− δ)i−1
∫ ∞
ν∗i
Aiν
−1g(v)dν. (5.5)
The number of exporters in each market is given by
ni = m(1− δ)i−1(1−G(ν∗i )), (5.6)
where G(ν) is the cumulative distribution function of firm productivity. Notice that a
fraction (1 − δ)i−1 of exporters will be exogenously shocked out of exporting status before
reaching the period in which they may enter market i.
Average export sales in market i are then given by
S¯i =
1
1−G(ν∗i )
∫ ∞
ν∗i
Aiν
−1g(v)dν. (5.7)
3When the cutoff for market i−1 binds, I am implicitly assuming that firms are myopic about the decrease
in fixed costs. Firms with productivity νi−1 > ν ≥
(
δ
fi−1
i−1 +(1−δ)
fi
i
Ai−1+(1−δ)Ai
) 1
−1
would have an incentive to incur
losses in market i in order to enter market j. In the calibrated model, less than 0.1 percent of firms behave
differently if I relax the assumption of myopia.
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5.3 Change in fi
Next, I consider the effect of a decrease in the fixed costs of entry fi.4 A change in bilateral
entry costs can have multiple effects because both the productivity cutoff and the market
entry order can potentially change. Some firms that would not enter market i facing fixed
costs fi will do so immediately facing f
′
i . In the long term, other firms for whom entry into
market i is eventually profitable will enter as well. The decrease in fixed costs may affect
other markets as well (I refer to these as ‘multilateral’ effects). If the cutoff for market i is
binding on market i+ 1 (νi = ν∗i+1), new exporters will enter market i+ 1 after the decrease
in fi. If the decrease in fi is large enough to affect the entry order of markets, exports into
markets i−k may be affected. On the one hand, deferring entry into market i−k means that
some exporters will exit before they have an opportunity to sell to market i − k. However,
exporters will also face lower fixed costs in market i− k: F ′i−k = fii−k+1 > Fi−k.
I start with the long-term (steady state) effect of the change in fi, assuming no change
in entry order:
dTSi
dfi
= −m(1− δ)i−1Ai (ν∗i )−1 g(ν∗i )(− 1)
dν∗i
dfi
.
Note that if ν∗i = νi−1,
dν∗i
dfi
= 0. Otherwise,
dν∗i
dfi
= 1
− 1
(
δfi
Aii
) 1
−1−1
.
If ν∗i+1 = νi, the change in the entry threshold for market i + 1 may be affected. The
change in the entry threshold for market i+ 1 is given by
dv∗i+1
dfi
= max{νi+1 − νi, dν
∗
i
dfi
}.
Large changes in the entry cost from fi to f
′
i will affect the entry ordering of markets.
4The intuition behind the effects of an increase in entry costs will be similar, but because increasing entry
costs faced by domestic firms is rarely a goal of policy, I focus on a decrease.
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Denote the productivity cutoff for market with previous order i and new order i′by
v∗i,i′ = max{νi′ , ν∗i′−1}.
A change of market order produces a discrete change in steady-state sales in market i,
given by
TSi′ − TSi = m
[
(1− δ)i′−1
∫ ∞
ν∗
i′
Ai′ν
−1g(v)dν − (1− δ)i−1
∫ ∞
ν∗i
Aiν
−1g(v)dν
]
.
The direction of the change in productivity is monotonic. In response to a decrease in
fi, v∗i,i′ ≤ v∗i . For simplicity, consider the case where a decrease in fi causes only only two
markets to switch order. Market i′ − 1 (previous market i) has a lower cutoff than market
i− 1:
v∗i,i′−1 = max{νi′−1, ν∗i′−2}.
The cutoff for market i′ − 2 is unaffected because fixed costs and the order are both
unchanged:
ν∗i′−2 = ν∗i′−2
The cutoff to enter the ii − 1th market falls (νi′−1 < νi−1) because
Ai
fi
<
Ai′−1
fi′−1
.
In other words the fixed costs associated with the new market i′ − 1 are low enough that
the size of market i relative to fixed costs is now large enough to precipitate a change in
market ordering. Finally, the cutoff to enter the i′th market falls:
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νi′ < νi
because exporters already experienced positive profits from entering this market one
period earlier:
Ai
fi
<
Ai′
fi′
.
In the period immediately following the change, all exporters of age k, where i′−1 ≤ k ≤ i,
that have productivity above the new cutoff will enter:
∆TSi′ (0) = m
i−i′∑
k=0
(1− δ)i
∫ ν∗i
ν∗
i′,i−k
Ai′ν
−1g(v)dν

Note that on the transition path to the new steady state, firms of age k have actually
entered more markets than prescribed by the new entry order. This implies that in the short
term, lower productivity firms will enter market i′ than in steady state. As these firms that
are below the steady-state cutoff exit exporting status, average firm exports will increase
slightly.
5.4 Calibration
In order to quantify how high the spillovers from market entry may be, I calibrate the model
to match key features of the data. I assume that export markets in the data are in steady
state, which allows me to equate the expressions in equations (5.5), (5.6), and (5.7) to their
analogs in the data. The values of each parameter of the model are reported in Table II.8.
Most values are estimated using my data, but I take values for certain parameters that are
difficult or impossible to estimate with customs data from the literature. I set the elasticity
of substitution  equal to the widely-used value from Broda and Weinstein (2006). In order
to pin down the probability of entering the first export market, which depends on the ratio
νm
ν∗i
(only the ratio matters here, so I assume νm = 1 for simplicity), I use the finding from
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Table II.8: Calibration
Parameter Target Moment Value
δ Average Dropout Rate .039
 Broda and Weinstein (2006) 6
β Shape of distribution function 6.6
ν1 Share of firms exporting, Ruhl and Willis (2017) 0.25
m Number of exporters 11,700
{Ai} Fraction of exporters in market -
{fi} Average sales per market -
Ruhl and Willis (2017) that an average of 25 percent of Colombian plants export.
I choose δ to match the weighted average one-year survival rate, finding an average
survival rate of 96 percent (high-revenue exporters survive at a far higher rate than the
unweighted average).
In order to parametrize the distribution of firm productivity parsimoniously, I assume
that firm productivity is Pareto distributed with cdf
G(ν) = 1−
(
νm
ν
)β
. (5.8)
I calibrate the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution by exploiting its relationship
with the distribution of firm sales as is common in the literature. The probability that an
exporting firm’s sales to market i exceed Si is given by
1− Pr(Si) =
(
Si
δFi
)− β
−1
. (5.9)
I estimate β
−1 using the relationship
logPr(Si) = − β
− 1 logSi + δi + i. (5.10)
I focus on a sample of the fifteen largest export markets in terms of total annual exports.
I then divide the sales in each foreign market into centiles to implement the regression, for
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which I use the top fifty percent of exporters.5 Given the assumed value of , I estimate
βˆ = 2.2 (0.02). Using this regression, it is possible to predict a minimum value of export
sales in each market. I use the average value for the top thirty percent of firms to mitigate
problems associated with local deviations between the empirical distribution of firm sales
and the assumed Pareto distribution.
I use the mean sales in each market S¯i given in equation (5.7) under the distributional
assumption in equation (5.8) to solve for the set of fixed costs paid for each market {Fi}:
S¯i =
β
β − (− 1)δFi. (5.11)
Notice that while the minimum value of sales can pin down Fi, this relationship cannot
inform about the fundamental parameter values {fi} without knowing the market ranking.
The market ranking will also be necessary in order to estimate values for the market-specific
terms {Ai}. I use the number of exporters that export to each market according to equation
(5.6) to calculate the probability that an exporter serves market i, conditional on surviving,
which is given by
ni
ni−1
= (1− d) 1−G(ν
∗
i )
1−G(ν∗i−1)
This simplifies to
ni
ni−1
= (1− d)
(
Fi−1
Fi
Ai
Ai−1
) β
−1
Bearing in mind that the fraction of firms who export to the first market is assumed to be
0.25, I use this expression to pin down the values of {Ai}.
Finally, the fraction of firms operating in each market implies the order of entry (n1 >
n2 > .. > nI). I solve for the parameter fi to satisfy equation (5.2). I find that the markets
into which exporters enter in early periods have significantly lower estimated entry costs fi,
while market size Ai is largely unrelated to entry order.
5The fact that a Pareto distribution fits best for the right tail of sales has been extensively documented.
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Table II.9: Export Market Sales and Entry Costs
Rank Country Average Sales Entry Costs Fi Percent of All Exporters
1 Venezuela 2,306 2,883 100
2 Ecuador 1,296 1,621 80
3 USA 1,707 2,134 66
4 Panama 406 507 54
5 Peru 1,469 1,836 39
6 Costa Rica 490 613 38
7 Mexico 1,093 1,367 34
8 Dominican Rep. 550 687 25
9 Guatemala 436 545 24
10 Chile 1,290 1,613 19
11 Spain 1,414 1,768 15
12 Brazil 3,897 4,872 9
13 Italy 3,554 4,444 6
14 China 10,818 13,526 5
15 Netherlands 4,529 5,663 4
Note: The table lists average sales per market and sunk entry costs paid in thousands of
USD in the calibrated model.
Finally, the mass of firms can be calculated by using the relationship
m1 = mG(ν∗1).
5.5 Model and the Data
In order to understand how well this simple model can capture salient features of the data,
I compare the predictions of the model to the closest empirical equivalent of the entry order
the model describes and to my empirical findings.
For the top fifteen markets in terms of export sales, I assign a rank based on the share
of exporters, weighted by sales, that export to the market. I compare this market rank with
the prediction of the model listed in Table II.9. I find a correlation of 0.95 between the rank
predicted by the model and the empirical ranking of markets. Given that the ordering in
the model relies essentially on the unweighted share of exporters that export to each market,
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Figure 5.1: Correlation Between the Empirical and Model Market Rank
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the correlation between the two market ranks should be high. Naturally, the prediction of
the data is less stark than that of the model: there is a positive probability that a firm with
only one export market will be selling to any of the top fifteen export markets.
Next, I compare the predictions of the model with my empirical findings. Two of the
findings are true in the model by assumption. First, new exporters have average export
sales in each individual foreign market because there are no intensive margin frictions in the
model. Second, exporters are constrained to enter markets sequentially. This result is more
extreme in the model for tractability but is intended to reflect the fact that new exporters
enter new markets over time.
There are three empirical findings that the model may or may not replicate depending
on how the parameterization affects average exporting behavior. The first finding to verify
is that new exporters have below average total sales for a period of about five years. The
average total sales of a new exporter that survived to year t of an export spell are simply the
sum of average exports to markets 1 to t. Average total exports for all exporters are given
by
AvgTtlSales =
∑
i
(1− δ)i−1
(
ν∗1
ν∗i
)β
S¯i
where S¯i is defined by equation (5.11).
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Figure 5.2: Total Sales of New and Average Exporters, Model
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Figure 5.2 shows what the relationship between new and average exports looks like in
the model. The pattern looks similar to the empirical pattern shown in Figure 3.1. It takes
just over six years for new exporters to reach average size. This is because I target the death
rate of exporters δ to match the weighted average across exporters, thereby overstating the
lifespan of the average firm. Note that average exports of both new and average firms are
also higher as a result of the decision to fit the model to the top 50 percent of exporters in
terms of sales.
The second finding to verify is the fact that new exporters have below average market
participation and reach the average slowly over a period of five years or more. A new exporter
in the model that survives for t years will sell to t markets provided that its productivity
exceeds the cutoff in equation (5.4):
AvgMarketst =
t∑
i=1
(
ν∗1
ν∗i
)β
.
The number of markets served by the average exporter is given by
AvgMarkets =
∑
i
(1− δ)i−1
(
ν∗1
ν∗i
)β
.
Figure 5.3 shows that the average exporter sells to about 6 markets. It takes 9 years for
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Figure 5.3: Number of Markets, New and Average Exporters, Model
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Figure 5.4: Number of Markets, New and Average Exporters, Model
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new exporters to catch up. Just as in the empirics, I find that even after total exports reach
the average, the firm still participates in fewer markets.
Finally, I find empirically that the entry hazard increases in the number of markets
served by an exporter and appears to be concave. I compare this empirical regularity with
the model-generated hazard G(ν∗i |ν > ν∗i−1). Figure 5.4 shows the result. For exporters in
less than 10 foreign markets, there increasing entry hazard as a function of the number of
markets. As the number of markets increases beyond 10, market size relative to fixed costs
falls, resulting in a decreasing probability of entry.
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6 Reducing Entry Costs
I evaluate the bilateral and multilateral effect of decreasing entry costs fi by 50 percent
one-by-one for each of the top fifteen export markets. A decrease in market-specific fixed
costs affects the number of exporters and the volume of exports to market i whenever the
new cutoff ν ′i is binding. Table II.10 reports the effects of reducing fixed costs fi market-
by-market on the number of exports and total exports. For the first market entered by
exporters, Venezuela, a 50 percent decrease in fixed costs results in a 92 percent increase in
the number of exporters serving the market. Average sales per exporter fall by 69 percent
because lower productivity exporters are able to sell to Venezuela, resulting in a 22 percent
increase in total annual exports. The largest bilateral benefit actually comes from decreasing
entry costs to China, which increases total exports by 25 percent.
Reducing entry costs to some markets results in effects that are not captured by the
bilateral benefits of the decrease in export costs. The ‘multilateral’ impact of reducing fi
can have a positive or negative impact on destinations j 6= i. More firms may export to
market j either because the decrease in fi decreases ν∗j (this happens when ν∗i = ν∗j ) or
because firms used to enter market i after market j, but now the entry order flips. This
implies that entry costs Fj fall as implied by equation (5.2). However, the multilateral effect
may also be negative when market i and market j switch entry order because a fraction
of exporters that used to export to market j will now drop out of exporter status before
entering j. Multilateral effects are generally modest. The largest multilateral gain comes
from reducing entry costs to Mexico, which results in an increase in exporters of 20 percent
to both Costa Rica and Peru and an increase in total export sales of 2 percent in each of those
markets. The largest negative effect comes from reducing entry costs to Chile, where the
reduction of entry costs results in an average 3 percent increase in the number of exporters
to Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala but a 2 percent decrease in total export
sales.
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While the effects in percentage terms are easier to digest, the variation in the size of fixed
costs and market size make it hard to evaluate the magnitude of these effects. Table II.11
displays the net effect of the decrease in bilateral fixed costs, assuming that the decrease in
fixed effects faced by exporters takes the form of a subsidy for exporting, such that the policy
maker pays 50 percent of the fixed costs fi. The biggest benefit comes from reducing fixed
costs to Venezuela, resulting in a total benefit of $336.6 million. This benefit is about 72
times larger that the benefit from reducing entry costs to Guatemala, despite the fact that
entry costs are relatively similar. Reducing entry costs to Guatemala results in a benefit
of only $4.7 million. The benefit is so small because delaying entry into Mexico and the
Dominican Republic results in loss in levels of $9.2 million.
In Mexico, where the multilateral benefits are highest in percentage terms, the net effect
is an increase in total profits from exporting of $42.2 million, of which $8.3 million come
from the multilateral effect on entry in Costa Rica and Peru. The multilateral increase in
profits plays a similarly large role in the benefits of reducing entry costs to Costa Rica.
7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that new exporter sales patterns are consistent with the existence
of extensive margin constraints resulting in a pattern of sequential market entry. I show
that intensive margin sales for new Colombian exporters are similar in magnitude to the
sales of other exporters after the first year, despite the fact that total sales reach the average
only in the fifth year, and that new exporters are disproportionately present in only the
top export markets despite the fact that they are likely to have higher productivity than
the average exporter. Furthermore, the probability that an exporter enters a new market
rises sharply in the number of markets served. These findings suggests that new exporters
may face higher costs of entry than other firms. A model in which exporters enter markets
sequentially and fixed costs fall with export experience fits these findings well. I show that
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as the result of lowering bilateral entry barriers, trade volumes can increase by up to $336.6
million bilaterally but also by up to $8.3 million in other markets as the result of the decreased
entry cost to these markets coming from the firm’s accumulation of export experience.
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Appendix A: A Variety-Adjusted
Price Index
In this section, I use shares and prices of grocery goods for the 26 cities in the data to
calculate an adjusted price index consistent with the CES utility structure in section 4.1. The
measured CPI relies upon a constant basket of goods, but under CES preferences, the price
level decreases in the number of varieties. I follow Broda and Weinstein (2010) in defining
a variety-adjusted price index consistent with a three-tier CES preference structure within
each retailer, but add an additional, uppermost tier describing consumer’s substitution across
retailers.6 I discuss this modeling decision and evidence from previous studies that retailers
are imperfect substitutes in section 3.1. Here, I begin by outlining the structure of the price
index and the assumptions needed to estimate elasticities of substitution. In sections 7 and
7, I will consider two well-known approaches to estimating elasticities of substitution, one
based on Feenstra (1994) and one on Hausman (1996).
In order to identify elasticities of substitution for each tier of the price level, I assume
that each coarse product group has a constant elasticity of substitution within each tier. For
brand-modules in the same group (e.g. Dole Canned Peaches in the Canned Fruit group),
the elasticity of substitution between UPCs in the brand-module will be the same. Similarly,
the elasticity of substitution across brand-modules in the group is constant. For brevity, I
6I abstract from the quality adjustment considerations discussed in Broda and Weinstein (2010). Differ-
ences in quality should be captured by products’ in-category market share.
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list only the expression for the most disaggregated tier: the growth in the price level for
brand-module b in group g:
Pb,rt
Pb,rt−2
=
∏
x∈Ω∗
b,t
(
pxb,rt
pxb,rt−2
)wg
xb,rt
(
λgb,rt
λgb,rt−2
) 1
σbg−1 (.1)
where Ω∗b,t denotes the set of UPCs common to periods t and t − 2 in group g and
wgbt = {wxb,rt}Ω∗b,rtare consumption weights to be specified below. The set of common UPCs
Ω∗b,t is a subset of all UPCs sold in a given time period, denoted Ωb,t. λ
g
b,rt is defined as
λgb,rt =
∑
Ω∗
b,t
pxb,rtqxb,rt∑
Ωb,t pxb,rtqxb,rt
, (.2)
In words, λgb,rt represents the share of all revenue in the brand-module attributable to
products sold in both t−2 and t. Notice that, all else equal, if the brand-module experiences
sales of new varieties in year t that exceed those in year t−2, λgb,rt falls relative to λgb,rt−2, and
the relative price level in year t also falls. Conversely, if new products represent a smaller
share of expenditures in the category in year t than in year t− 2, the price level rises. The
strength of the impact of the share ratio λ
g
b,rt
λg
b,rt−2
is governed by the elasticity of substitution
σbg. Again following the literature, I define the weight on price inflation for common products
as the Sato-Vartia (1976) weights based on the share of variety x in total expenditures on
common products, sxt = pxb,rtqxb,rt∑
Ω∗
b,t
pxb,rtqxb,rt
,
wgxb,rt =
sg
xb,rt
−sg
xb,rt−2
lnsg
xb,rt
−lnsg
xb,rt−2∑
Ω∗
b,t
sg
xb,rt
−sg
xb,rt−2
lnsg
xb,rt
−lnsg
xb,rt−2
. (.3)
Sato-Vartia weights represent a method of chain-weighting. While it is possible to com-
pute an adjusted price index using either Laspeyres or Paasche weights, thereby imitat-
ing the conventional measured CPI, each of these expenditure weight schemes introduces
a set of mismeasurement concerns due to substitution, precisely the issue this adjusted
price index is attempting to resolve. The Sato-Vartia is an ideal weight in the sense that
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c(pt,Ωb,t)/c(pt−1,Ωb,t−2) = Pt/Pt−2 in the absence of demand shocks to common goods. Red-
ding and Weinstein (2016) note that these weights are different from those implied by a ideal
CES price index with time-varying taste shocks and propose an alternative weighting scheme.
However, the common goods price growth and the variety adjustment remain log-separable
in their ideal CES price index. Because my primary interest is in producing a comparison
between a typical measured price index (here, chain-weighted) and a variety-adjusted price
level, I retain this weighting scheme.7 If there are additional sources of mismeasurement in
the conventional CPI, the price index defined in (.1) is no longer exact, but as long as the
sources of mismeasurement are multiplicatively separable, it remains an exact measure of
the bias created by considering only a common basket of varieties.
The price indices for the middle and top tier are constructed similarly. The data includes
a product group (coarse category), product module (fine product category) and brand for
each UPC. In calculating the empirical price index, I allow for two different elasticities
within each group: the elasticity of substitution across UPCs within a brand-module σgb ,
and across brand-modules in the same group σga. There is one elasticity across product
groups within each retailer, σg , and across retailers, σr. The four-tiered utility function
allows for foure different variety adjustment terms in principle. The addition of a new brand
within a module or a new module within a group could imply greater welfare gains, since
fewer close substitutes for the new variety may exist. In practice, I restrict the sample to a
constant sample of product groups and consider a set of retailers that are common to both
periods. There are only two relevant variety adjustment terms: the within brand-module
adjustment defined in equation (.2) and the across brand-module adjustment within each
retailer that is calculated similarly.
The price index for final consumption is given by
7A requirement of this or any other measure of the price level using data on prices and expenditures is
that demand shocks ‘net out’ across the set of products common to the two periods. Otherwise, the consumer
experiences a wholesale increase in utils per dollar which cannot be measured.
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Pt
Pt−2
=
∏
r∈R
∏
g∈Ω
 ∏
b∈Ω∗g,t
 ∏
x∈Ω∗
b,t
(
pxb,rt
pxb,rt−2
)wg
xb,rt
(
λgb,rt
λgb,rt−2
) 1
σbg−1

wg
b,rt (
λgrt
λrgt−2
) 1
σ
g
a−1

wgrt

wrt
(.4)
where Ω∗g,t represents the set of common brand-modules within the group and the shares
of common brand-modules within the group, wgb,rt, shares of each group within the retailer
wgrt, and shares of each retailer wrt in total consumption are defined analogously to wgxb,rt in
equation (.3).
The variety-adjusted price index in equation (.4) allows for a flexible estimate of gains
from the entry of new product varieties. The contribution to gains from variety in each
product category is affected by three elements of the price level: the relative share of new
products, the elasticity of substitution, and the category consumption weight.
First, the value of new products to consumers is measured as their share of total revenue.
Varieties within a product category that are most valued by consumers are likely to have a
high revenue share, either because they are purchased in large quantities or because they are
expensive as a result of high demand. Therefore, the share of common products λ is likely to
fall significantly between t− 2 and t when a new variety that is highly valued by consumers
enters the market in period t, while it will rise when a product with a high revenue share
leaves the market between t− 2 and t.
Second, the welfare implications of the growth or fall in the share of common products
are adjusted by the elasticity of substitution in each category. Because the substitutability
of products may vary widely across categories, it is essential to adjust the contribution
of the extensive margin accordingly. Suppose that products in a brand-module are near-
perfect substitutes, implying that if a new and relatively inexpensive product enters the
market, it will represent a very large share of revenues in the brand-module. This will occur
even if the difference in prices between the two goods is small, resulting in a very large
λ ratio. Clearly, the welfare implications of a slight decrease in the price should also be
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small. Raising the expression to the power 1
σg
b
−1 , the same expression found in the CES price
index, adjusts the price level by scaling down the contribution of the extensive margin in
highly substitutable product categories relative to less elastic categories. I restrict σ > 1
for the elasticity of substitution within brand-modules and across brand-modules within the
same product group.8 Because the extensive margin at the group level is inactive, the upper
tier elasticities do not need to be estimated: their values are implicit in the relative group
weights wgrt and wrt. The elasticities of substitution σgb and σga play a large role in capturing
the welfare implications of the extensive margin. The procedure for estimating them is
addressed in detail in the next section.
The third and final aspect of the price level that affects the variety-adjustment to the
price level is the set of weights wt. The level of activity on the extensive margin may vary
widely across product types, which could be driven by demand- or supply-side differences
between types of producers. The relative weights between categories, which are applied to
the common goods price index and the variety adjustment, re-weight the contribution of each
category’s extensive margin by its share in consumption. This again captures the intuition
that the consumer does not value variety per se, but rather a larger consumption set in
important expenditure categories.
The data contain prices and expenditures for each product, which provides all the infor-
mation necessary to calculate an adjusted price index except the within and across elasticities
σgb and σga. I now describe how I estimate these elasticities following approaches based on
Feenstra (1994) and Hausman (1996).
Feenstra (1994) Elasticities
The difficulty of estimating the elasticity of demand based on price and quantity data is
well-known. Without more information or assumptions, it is impossible to disentangle de-
mand and supply shocks. Here, the large number of observations for a panel of many related
8With inelastic demand for varieties, the price level is infinite whenever one variety is unavailable. This
is true, for example, in Cobb-Douglas or Leontief preference structures.
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products offers the opportunity to make some reasonable and relatively non-restrictive as-
sumptions. Before writing down the estimation structure formally, I will sketch out the
approach.
Following Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2010), I assume that the elasticities
of demand and supply are constant within the product group tier. For example, take the
canned fruit product group, containing the canned peach and canned pineapple product
modules. This structure allows the within brand-module (different types of canned peaches
sold by the same brand) and across brand-module (different types of canned fruit sold by
any brand) elasticities to differ, but their values are the same for all brand-modules in the
group. Without this type of assumption, each product pair could presumably have a different
elasticity of substitution. Holding the elasticities constant within the product group allows
for differences in substitutability in clearly distinct groups (e.g. Canned Fruit vs. Tea) while
ensuring that there are enough observations per elasticity to make estimation possible.
One challenge to identification concerns the presence of common shocks to all products
in a category. Seasonality, changes in taste, changes in cost from common suppliers, or
changes in the competitiveness of the industry could all contribute to shocks that change
not only the prices of individual products, but also the price level of goods in the category,
potentially biasing elasticity estimates. I identify a benchmark product and calculate a log
difference-in-difference of all other products’ sales shares and prices versus the change in
these variables for the benchmark product in order to net out common time trends. Finally,
I assume that idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks are uncorrelated.
I now will describe the procedure for estimating the brand-module elasticities, which I
will call the ‘within’ elasticities, more concretely. Allowing sbvt to denote the share of variety
v within brand-module b in group g, I note that
sbvt = bvt
(
pvt
P bt
)1−σg
b
(.5)
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where bvt is an idiosyncratic demand shifter for variety v at time t. Taking logs and first-
differencing,
∆lnsbvt = ξbt + (1− σgb )∆lnpvt + ∆lnbvt (.6)
where ξbt = (1− σgb )∆lnP bt and E[lnbvt] = 0.
The problem of the firm will be developed further below. For the purpose of estimation,
I assume that the inverse elasticity of supply in each product group is given by ωbg ≥ 0,
allowing for the possibility that marginal costs are increasing in production.9 In logged
first-differences,
∆lnpvt = ζbt +
ωbg
1 + ωbg
∆lnsbvt + ∆lnδbvt (.7)
where ζbt =
ωbg
1+ωbg
∆lnExpbt , δbvt represents an idiosyncratic shock to marginal cost of variety v
at time t, and E[lnδbvt] = 0. I restrict E[bvtδbvt] = 0: demand and supply shocks are assumed to
be uncorrelated. Last, to remove the brand-time fixed effects, I take the first difference of the
share and price data of each variety v versus a reference variety v′ in the same brand-module.
Define ∆′lnxv = ∆lnxv −∆lnxv′ . Equation (.6) becomes:
∆′lnsbvt = (1− σgb )∆′lnpvt + ∆′lnbvt, (.8)
while Equation (.7) becomes
∆′lnpvt = ωbg∆′lnsbvt + ∆′lnδbvt. (.9)
The intuition of the procedure to follow, as set out in Leamer (1981), is that given a pair
of price and quantity observations for one variety, the combinations of demand and supply
elasticities that could possibly give rise to these observations are described by a hyperbola.
9This approach was developed in Feenstra (1994).
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The assumption that these elasticities are constant within the product group allows us to
choose the (σ, ω) point where the hyperbolas for each variety intersect. However, equations
(.6) and (.7) suffer from bias due to the fact that the errors bvt and δbvt are correlated with pbvt
and sbvt. The assumption that the parameters to be estimated are constant across varieties
in the same brand-module allows for consistent parameter estimates following the approach
in Leamer (1981). Exploiting the uncorrelated errors, I take the product of equations (.8)
and (.9):
(∆′lnpvt)2 = θ1 (∆′lnsvt)2 + θ2 (∆′lnpvt) (∆′lnsvt) + uvt
where θ1 = ωg(1+ωg)(σab−1) , θ2 =
1−ωg(σab−2)
(1+ωg)(σab−1)
, and uvt = ∆′lnbvt∆′lnδbvt, Note that the error uvt
is still correlated with the transformed price and share variables. Following Feenstra (1994)
by averaging across t within a variety v, I obtain the following equation, the bar denoting
the average:
(∆′lnpv)2 = θ1(∆′lnsv)2 + θ2(∆′lnpv) (∆′lnsv) + uv (.10)
and estimate by GMM with Hansen (1982) weights, with the number of moment condi-
tions equal to the number of varieties in set Ωvb. A weak condition must hold for any pair
of varieties v and v′, namely
var(∆′lnbvt)
var(∆′lnbv′t)
6= var(∆
′lnδbvt)
var(∆′lnδbv′t)
.
This restriction rules out the case in which products in the same category have exactly
proportional demand and supply shock distributions, which would imply that their σand ω
estimates were co-linear.
Broda and Weinstein (2006) suggest a modification of Feenstra’s procedure in the case
where the estimates θ1 and θ2 from equation (.10) yield imaginary or non-feasible estimates
of the elasticities (i.e. σ < 1, ω < 0). In these cases, I conduct a grid search in the interval
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Table A.1: Demand and Supply Elasticity Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
σb ωb σa ωa
Number of Product Groups 61 61 61 61
Number of Significant Estimates 60 59 59 56
Percentiles of Elasticity Dist.
10th 3.94 0.14 3.31 0.07
25th 4.79 0.28 4.50 0.25
50th 6.08 0.49 6.28 0.87
75th 8.13 0.70 35.48 1.95
90th 17.14 1.79 50.50 4.28
Note: The table describes the within and across elasticity estimates for the categories in
which they could be estimated.
σg ∈ [1.05, 131.5] at intervals of 0.05 to identify the value that minimizes the GMM objective.
In cases in which I am unable to calculate an elasticity that is statistically different from zero,
I impute the median elasticity estimate from the rest of the sample. There are 61 product
groups; I calculate 60 significant ‘within’ elasticities and 59 significant ‘across’ elasticities.10
The process to estimate the ‘across’ elasticities is similar, using the weighted average price
for items in each brand within the module and the share of each brand instead of individual
goods’ prices and shares.
Table A.1 reports descriptive statistics on these estimates in columns (1) to (4), as well as
the distribution of (5) within brand-module common expenditure ratios λt
λt−2 b
and (6) across
brand-module common expenditure ratios λt
λt−2 b
for each group. My elasticity estimates are
a little smaller than those in Broda and Weinstein (2010), who use a different set of product
groups and report median within and across elasticities of 11.5 and 7.5. In the adjusted
price index calculations that follow, I use the baseline estimates in (1) and (3), but also
compare them with median elasticity estimates from Broda and Weinstein (2010). Perhaps
surprisingly, the ‘across’ elasticities are slightly larger than the ‘within’ elasticities. Large
elasticities push the gains from variety toward zero.
10One of the ‘within’ elasticities and three of the ‘across’ are generated using grid search.
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However, as columns (5) and (6) demonstrate, most of the gains from variety occur within
brand-module, making the ‘across’ elasticities relatively less important. The median ‘within’
common expenditure ratio is 0.93, indicating that the share of products that existed in both
t and t− 2 in total annual sales fell by 7 percent in t relative to t− 2. The median ‘across’
expenditure ratio is 0.99, indicating that the share of existing brands within the group fell
by 1 percent in the two year period. Not surprisingly, new brands arrive less frequently than
new products within an existing brand. 90 percent of groups experience increases in variety
within brand-modules over a two year period, suggesting that gains will not be driven by
one particular type of product.
Calculating the CPI Bias
Next, I apply these estimates to the calculation of city-level price indices according to Equa-
tion (.4). Table A.2 reports the distribution of the average annual CPI bias across the 26
cities in the sample. Each city experiences an average annual welfare gain of at least 1.5
percent. The distribution of city-year annual bias estimates is reported in column (1). The
variability reflected in the average annual bias is amplified in the cumulative gains for the pe-
riod 2008-2014 reported in column (2). The median city experiences welfare gains equivalent
to a 9.77 percent drop in the price level over the period. The city with the highest welfare
gains experiences a cumulative variety adjustment that is 3.9 percentage points larger than
the adjustment in the city with the lowest welfare gains.
Hausman (1996) Elasticities
While the Feenstra (1994) technique is frequently used in settings that require the estima-
tion of a large number of elasticities, there are also alternative methods commonly used to
estimate elasticities. In this section, I describe a technique based on Hausman (1996). The
identifying assumption in this approach is that the price of a UPC does not vary based on
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Table A.2: CPI Bias Estimates
Baseline Elasticity Measures
(1) (2)
Annual Bias Cumul. Bias
2007-2014
Percentile
5th 0.92 8.13
10th 0.96 8.22
25th 1.16 8.77
50th 1.37 9.77
75th 1.60 10.27
90th 1.77 11.27
95th 1.85 11.56
Note: The table reports annualized and cumulative percentage estimates of the bias of the CPI due to
changes in product variety.
city-specific cost as well as that there are no national UPC-level demand shocks. As a result,
changes in price in other cities can be used as an instrument for shifts in the supply curve.
Specifically, the inverse supply function for UPC v belonging to brand b sold in city i at time
t is given by
ln pbv,it = δbln cbv,t + αbv,i + βbit + wbv,it
Notice that cost cvb,t does not vary at the city level. The estimation allows for city-specific,
time-invariant differences in cost across cities for the UPC and for city-specific cost shocks
at the brand level. The error wbv,it reflects mean-zero idiosyncratic variation in the price
of the variety stemming from local disturbances such as variation in the timing of sales by
store managers across cities. The fixed cost structure invites the same double-differencing
approach taken above. The change in the price of UPC v in city i is given by
∆ln pbv,it = δb∆ln cbv,t + ∆βbit + ∆wbv,it
To remove the brand-time fixed effects, I take the first difference of the share and price
data of each variety v versus a reference variety v′ in the same brand-module. Define
∆′lnxv = ∆lnxv −∆lnxv′ .
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∆′ln pbv,it = δb∆′ln cvb,t + ∆′wvb,it (.11)
No new assumptions are required on consumer demand. As in the Feenstra technique,
demand in logged first-differences is given by
∆′lnsbvt = (1− σgb )∆′lnpvt + ∆′lnbvt, (.12)
The structure of the inverse supply equation (.11) suggests that supply-side changes in the
differenced price ∆′ln pvb,it can be identified using the price in other markets as an instrument.
Any cmobination of the price in other markets could be a valid vector of instruments, but the
computational burden associated with using the price in indiudual cities as an instrument
is large in this setting. I adopt the commonly used strategy of computing, for each market,
the average price in all other markets. The first stage is given as follows:
∆′ln pbv,it = γb0 + γb1
∑
j 6=i
∆′ln pbv,jt
I − 1 + u
b
v,it
Equation (.12) is the second stage.
The process to estimate the ‘across’ elasticities is similar, using the weighted average price
for items in each brand within the module and the share of each brand instead of individual
goods’ prices and shares. I report the elasticities calculated using this approach in the table
below. In cases in which I am unable to calculate an elasticity that is statistically different
from zero, I impute the median elasticity estimate from the rest of the sample. There are
61 product groups; I calculate 53 significant ‘within’ elasticities and 33 significant ‘across’
elasticities.
Table A.3 reports descriptive statistics on these estimates in columns (1) to (4). The
median ‘within’ elasticity is 1.99, significantly smaller than the median elasticity calculated
using the Feenstra technique. The median ‘across’ elasticity is 1.35. Because an elasticity
closer to one will yield a larger implied welfare gain given the same ratio λt
λt−2
, the set of
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Table A.3: Demand and Supply Elasticity Estimates
(1) (2)
σb σa
Number of Product Groups 60 60
Number of Significant Estimates 53 33
Percentiles of Elasticity Dist.
10th 1.22 1.07
25th 1.77 1.19
50th 1.99 1.35
75th 2.37 1.51
90th 2.64 1.73
Note: The table describes the within and across elasticity estimates for the categories in which
they could be estimated.
elasticities estimated using the Hausman approach will yield larger estimates for each city.
Calculating the CPI Bias
Next, I apply these estimates to the calculation of city-level price indices according to Equa-
tion (.4). Table A.4 reports the distribution of the average annual CPI bias across the 26
cities in the sample. Each city experiences an average annual welfare gain of at least 6.6
percent. The distribution of city-year annual bias estimates is reported in column (1). The
variability reflected in the average annual bias is amplified in the cumulative gains for the pe-
riod 2008-2014 reported in column (2). The median city experiences welfare gains equivalent
to an 86 percent drop in the price level over the full sample period.
The welfare gains calculated using Hausman elasticities are almost ten times as large
as those calculated using the Feenstra method. I choose to use the Feenstra elasticities in
the main text because it leads to more conservative estimates of the welfare impact of new
varieties and the magnitude of demand shock transmission across cities. Results using the
Hausman elasticities would be qualitatively similar though the magnitude of welfare gains
transmitted across cities and their business cycle variation would be larger.
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Table A.4: CPI Bias Estimates
Baseline Elasticity Measures
(1) (2)
Annual Bias Cumul. Bias
2008-2014
Percentile
5th 6.6 73.8
10th 7.5 73.9
25th 9.7 78.5
50th 12.1 86.0
75th 15.2 92.0
90th 18.0 106.7
95th 19.4 109.0
Note: The table reports annualized and cumulative percentage estimates of the bias of the CPI due to changes in product
variety.
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Appendix B: Model Extension,
Variable Markups
The model of product choice with multi-city retailers developed in section 4 made the
simplifying assumption that firms are small enough that they do not internalize their effect
on the price level in making product decisions. However, with a finite number of retailers
in each market, it is possible that retailers could be large enough to have significant market
power. This section develops a variant of the model that allows for changes in market share
to affect the product entry decision made by each retailer. Household preferences remain as
described in section 4.1 and the production of grocery and non-grocery goods is as described
in section 4.2.2.
The only change will be to the problem of the grocery retailer. I develop the retailer’s
problem below, allowing the retailer to choose a city-specific markup. I make this choice
based on evidence from the literature. Handbury and Weinstein (2015) find that there is
relatively little within-retailer variation in the price of each product, despite the fact that
costs are presumably higher in large cities, implying that the markup on goods is smaller in
large cities. Hottman (2015) rationalizes the decline in markup with city size as the result
of greater competition between retailers in larger locations. In my model, costs do not vary
at the city level, so allowing the markup to depend on the price at the city level will result
in different prices across locations.
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Firms
Grocery Retailers
Grocery retailers r choose how many product varieties to sell and choose a markup µri to
set on all products in each city i order to maximize their total profits subject to a stocking
cost F (nr) with F ′(nr) > 0 as in the baseline model. For simplicity, I again assume that
the average marginal cost of goods sold at the retailer m¯c is unaffected by the number of
products chosen and is common to all retailers. Retailers face total grocery expenditures Xi
and a price level Pi in each city. The retailer’s problem can be expressed as
max
µri,nr
I∑
i=1
γri
(
1− 1
µri
)n
1
1−σg
ri µrim¯c
Pi

1−σr
Xi − F (nr) (.13)
The retailer’s price level is given by
Pri = n
1
1−σg
ri µrim¯c (.14)
and Pi denotes the city grocery price level, defined as
Pi =
∑
r∈Ri
γriP
1−σr
ri
 11−σr . (.15)
For all cities i such that r /∈ Ri, the taste parameter γri is equal to zero. As before,
fixed costs are paid nationally, so there is no motive for the retailer to choose an individual
product line nri for each market. However, I allow for a relationship of the form nri = τinr
between the global product line and the set of varieties ultimately available in city i. The
term τi can be interpreted as an additional cost associated with providing varieties to city i
if τi < 1.
Practically, this term allows the model to rationalize the fact that New York and Los
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Angeles experience slightly higher gains from variety than other cities even within retailers,
though this is unrelated to changes in demand in those two cities. Setting τi = 1∀i will yield
the same predictions quantitatively and qualitatively for every city but these two.
The first order condition with respect to the choice of µri is standard:
dµri :
(
1
µ2ri
)
sriXi +
[
(1− σr)
(
1− 1
µri
)
sri(1− sri)Xi
µri
]
= 0 (.16)
where sri = γri
n 11−σgri µrm¯c
Pi
1−σr . The firm faces a trade-off between profit-per-unit and its
share of the market: increasing the markup increases flow profits per unit, but tends to
decrease the firm’s overall share. I depart from the previous section in that I assume that
firms are small enough that s2ri ≈ 0, i.e. that firms set the monopolistically competitive
markup rather than a variable markup based on retailer share.
The first order condition with respect to the choice of nr is
dnr :
I∑
i=1
[
1− σr
1− σg
(
1− 1
µri
)
sri
Xi
nr
− 1− σr1− σg
(
1− 1
µri
)
s2ri
Xi
nr
]
− F ′(nr) = 0. (.17)
As noted, increasing the length of the product line increases the retailer’s share of demand
because the consumer has love for variety: the same utility of consumption is less expensive
at a retailer whose grocery bundle includes more varieties. I assume that F ′(0) = 0 so that
all retailers sell products.
Solving these two first order conditions yields a gross markup that varies with the re-
tailer’s share of market i
µri =
1
(σr − 1) (1− sri) + 1 (.18)
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The optimal product line is given by
nr =
1
(σg − 1)
∑
i
sriXi
µri
F ′(nr)
. (.19)
Higher marginal stocking costs and greater substitutability between goods both lead to
shorter product lines. All else equal, a retailer with larger global sales will have a longer
product line. However, if the gross markup in a particular city is high, the retailer will
‘discount’ the revenues that it receives from that city. From equation (.18) , the gross
markup will be larger if retailer substitutability σr is low or the share of the retailer sri is
high. There are two reasons why a retailer might have high sales in city i: it may be that
total expenditure Xi is large, in which case the incentive to increase the product line to
capture a larger share is high, or it may be that retailer r already has a high market share
sri in that city, in which case it faces a reduced incentive to compete.
Retailer Profits
There are aggregate profits in the economy because free entry does not hold in the retail
sector. They depend on the size of the retailer and on the stocking cost F (nr). Given
equations (.18) and (.19), the general expression for the retailer’s profits pir is
pir =
∑
i
sriXi
σr(1− sri) + sri − F (nr) (.20)
Let the stocking cost be given by
F (nr) =
(
nr
nc
)α
. (.21)
The term in the denominator nc will allow for trend growth in the number of varieties and
accommodate differences in trend growth across the four categories to which food retailers
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in the data belong: convenience stores, drug stores, grocery stores and mass retailers. The
length of the product line under this stocking cost parametrization is given by
nr =
 ∑i sriXiµri
α(σg − 1)
 1α nc (.22)
If α > 1, the stocking cost is strictly convex in the length of the product line nr.
Profits can be expressed as a function of the firm’s sales, its markup, and parameters.
For convenience, define σri = σr(1− sri) + sri:
pir =
I∑
i=1
1
σri
(
1− σri − 1
α(σg − 1)
)
sriXi (.23)
Weakly positive profits for all firms requires that α > σri−1
σg−1 . Since σri ≤ σr ≤ σg, this
condition only requires that the stocking cost not exhibit large increasing returns to scale in
the size of the product line. It is always satisfied if the marginal cost of adding a product is
constant or increasing.
Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Markets clear as described in section 4.3 and the equilibrium is as described in section 4.4.
Business Cycle Interpretation
In order to understand how the decisions of retailers can transmit productivity shocks across
cities, I compare equilibria under a set of city-level productivities ai,t−1 and ai,t. It is conve-
nient to compare steady states in terms of log changes, where xˆ = dlogx. In this analysis, I
assume that tastes are constant over time: γˆri = 0.
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I focus on the impact of city-level shocks {aˆi}i∈I on the length of an arbitrary retailer’s
product line and markup and therefore on consumer welfare. First, log-linearizing equation
(.22) gives an expression for the change in product line length:
nˆr =
1
α
∑
i
ωri(sˆri + Xˆi − µˆri) + nˆc. (.24)
The change in the length of the retailer’s product line not only depends on exogenous
changes in demand, but also on the change in its share and therefore markup.
The growth rate of the markup of the retailer in city i is given by
µˆri =
sri
(1− sri)σri sˆri. (.25)
The change in the share is given by
sˆri = (1− σr)(Pˆri −
∑
r′∈Ri
sriPˆr′i) (.26)
Transforming equation (.14), the change in the retailer’s global price is given by
Pˆri =
1
1− σg nˆri + µˆri. (.27)
The growth in the price set by each retailer in each city incorporates the cost term τi, which
enters through nˆri. Note that because wi = ai in every city, ˆ¯mc = 0 in general.
Combining these expressions, the change in the retailer’s price can be expressed as a
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function of parameters and its own demand:
Pˆri =
1
1− σg
1
α
∑
i
ωri
[(
1− sri(1− sri)σri
)
sˆri + Xˆi
]
+ 11− σg (nˆc + τˆi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Product Variety
(.28)
+ sri(1− sri)σri sˆri︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Markup
Log-linearizing the city grocery price level Pi in equation (.15) gives
Pˆi =
∑
r
sriPˆri. (.29)
Notice that in the model with variable markups, demand shocks may lead to changes
on the intensive margin of the price level as the markup on all goods rises or falls, along
with the impact on the price level coming from new products, a mechanism common to the
baseline model.
City-Level Contributions to Retailer Variety
In order to understand how shocks to ai may be transmitted to other cities through changes
in the set of available products, I decompose the change in the retailer price Pˆr into contri-
butions coming from each city in which the retailer operates. I denote the impact of demand
in city j on retailer r’s price level by Tˆrj. The full impact of demand in city j on city i’s
price level is a weighted sum of each contribution Tˆrj, where the weights are the share of
retailer r in city i’s expenditure. I describe the derivation of the expression for the impact
of city j on city i’s demand, denoted Tˆij, in what follows.
I use equation (4.29) to decompose equation (4.30) into the contribution of each city j
to the change in retailer r’s price, denoting this contribution by Tˆrj:
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Pˆri =
∑
j
ωriTˆrj +
sri
(1− sri)σri sˆri (.30)
where the contribution of city j to the change in the price level of retailer r is given by
Tˆrj =
1
1− σg
1
α
ωrj
[(
1− srj(1− srj)σrj
)
sˆrj + Xˆj
]
+ 11− σg nˆc (.31)
The contribution of demand growth in city j to the price level in city i can be expressed
as the sum of city j’s contributions Tˆrj to retailers in set Rij, weighted by the share sri of
each retailer in city i’s demand. I denote the total contribution of city j to city i’s price level
by Tˆij. Combining equation (.29) with equations (.30) and (.31), the change in the price
level in city i due to contributions to each retailer’s price from city j is given by
Tˆij =
∑
r∈Rij
sriωrjTˆrj. (.32)
Finally, combining equation (.31) with equation (.32) expresses the connection between
demand in city j and city i’s price level:11
Tˆij =
1
1− σg
∑
r∈Rij
sriωrj
(
1
α
[(
1− srj(1− srj)σrj
)
sˆrj + Xˆj
]
+ nˆc
)
(.33)
Equation (.33) expresses an intuitive relationship between demand in city pairs. City j
has a larger impact on price level changes in city i whenever common retailers Rij represent
a large fraction of consumption in city i (sri is large), these retailers derive a significant
fraction of their revenue from city j (ωrj is large), or demand shocks in city j are particularly
11Because
∑
j ωrj = 1, the contribution of each city to trend growth nˆccan be divided proportionally
across cities.
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significant (Xˆj is large).
Calibrated Model
In this section, I recalibrate the parameters σg, α, τiand nˆc as well as the elasticity of sub-
stitution σr between retailers that governs the relationship between changes in the retailer’s
price and share as a result of demand shocks. Initial shares {sri, ωri} remain as characterized
in section 5.1. I estimate an elasticity of substitution across retailers using the technique
outlined in Appendix Section 7. I find a value of σr = 1.2 (0.04), implying relatively low
substitutability across retailers.
Next, I describe how the values of the fixed cost parameter α from equation (.21), elas-
ticity of substitution across goods σg, cost parameter τi and trend growth rate of product
variety nˆc are chosen. As in section 5.2, I measure the shock to city-level demand as total
demand growth in each city-year. Because I relax the assumption that retailers are small
and do not internalize their impact on the price level, the choice of variety is itself a function
of the change in the retailer’s share. I use the weighted average growth in a retailer’s markets
as an instrument for exogenous growth in the retailer’s revenue:
Xˆrt−1 =
∑
i
ωritXˆit−1 (.34)
nˆri,t = β1
(
Xˆr,t−1 +
∑
i
ωri,t
[
1− sri,t(1− sri,t)σri
]
sˆri,t
)
+ β2(1− LANY Ci) + Γc + ri,t (.35)
sˆri = (1− σr)(Pˆri −
∑
r′∈Ri
sriPˆr′i) (.36)
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Table B.1: Parameter Calibration Regression
Parameters Value
α 6.51
(0.61)
τˆ -0.007
(0.001)
Number of Obs 2,007
Retailers 70
R2 0.39
Note: The table reports the results of regression equation (.35), which is used to calibrate
parameters α and τˆ .
Pˆri =
1
1− σg nˆri +
sri
(1− sri)σri sˆri (.37)
Because nˆri,t depends on sˆri, which in turn depends on the shocks faced by retailer r
relative to other retailers in the set Ri, I estimate the parameters in this system of equations
using a two-step numerical procedure. In an inner loop, I solve the system of equations for
a given vector of parameters, while the outer loop minimizes mean squared error over the
parameter space. Table B.1 reports the parameters τi and α calculated using this method.
The values are almost identical to those found in Table B.1.
Next, I characterize the contribution of changes in market share to changes in product
variety. The growth in product variety at the retailer level depends on a function, denoted
γˆr,t, of the change in the retailer’s share sri,t in each market:
γˆr,t =
∑
i
ωri,t
[
1− sri,t(1− sri,t)σri
]
sˆri,t (.38)
The changes in share sˆri,t predicted by the model are small: the minimum change in retailer-
city share is -0.11 percent and the maximum is 0.23 percent. For most retailers, equation
(.38) suggests that the weighted net effect of changes in shares γˆr,t will be smaller because
the coefficient on sˆri,t will be between zero and one. For retailers with large shares sri,t such
106
Table B.2: Parameter Values in Baseline Calibration
Value
Expenditure and Revenue Shares {sri, ωri} Table I.6
City Trend Growth Adjustment τˆ -0.007
Retailer Elasticity of Substitution σr 1.20
Goods Elasticity of Substitution σg 4.09
Stocking Cost Shape Parameter α 6.51
Notes: The table summarizes the parameter values used in the calibration. The distribution of shares, which implicitly defines
γri, was discussed previously.
that sri,t > 2(1 − sri)σri, the net effect of a change in share may not only be negative but
have an elasticity greater than one with respect to the change in share. For this subset
of firms, the negative effect on variety generated by an increase in market share outweighs
the positive effect of an increase in revenue. In practice, the potential for amplification of
changes in share is relatively unimportant: γˆr,t is smaller than the weighted change in shares
for 97 percent of retailers in the sample.
I also consider the implication of equation (.27) for changes in the price on the intensive
margin. The correlation between the model-implied change in the markup and measured
changes in city-retailer price is -0.026, suggesting that the small changes in inflation suggested
by the model are not important in explaining changes in price on the intensive margin.
The value of all parameters in the model with variable markups are summarized in Table
B.2. To evaluate the model’s predictions, I use the calibration of the parameters in equations
(.24) and (.27) to predict city-level welfare gains based on demand growth in each city. I
compare the model’s predictions to the welfare gains calculated in section 3.1 using microdata
at the UPC level. The predictions of the model are plotted against the gains based on micro
data in Figure B.1. Within the period 2008-2010, the correlation between the baseline model
and the microdata estimate is 0.75, while within the period 2011-2014 it is 0.86. Overall,
the correlation between the baseline model and the microdata estimates is 0.92.
Notice that the fit between the model with variable markups and the gains calculated
from microdata is almost exactly the same as the fit between the baseline model and the
microdata-based welfare gains. In fact, the correlation between the two models is close to
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Figure B.1: Baseline Model Predicted Welfare Gains vs. Microdata-Based Welfare Gains
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Notes: The figure compares the prediction of the calibrated model to the welfare gains
estimated using UPC-level microdata for each retailer.
one, suggesting there are essentially no improvements in the prediction generated by allowing
for variation in the amount of product entry generated by changes in market power.
The irrelevance of market power in explaining net product entry is not surprising. Within
the subset of cities in the sample, retailers rarely have significant market power, especially
considering that the shares as measured in the Nielsen data represent an upper bound on the
true market share including non-participating retailers. Furthermore, the model only allows
for changes in market share generated by demand shocks. In the data, there may be retailer
or retailer-city specific shocks affecting consumer taste. Modeling these shocks could result
in a somewhat larger role for changes in market share and markups in explaining changes
in product variety, but the finding above that γr,t <
∑
i ωri,tsˆri,t for at least 97 percent of
retailers in the data suggests that no change in market share is likely to result in large
differences in the predicted growth of variety in this model.
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Appendix C: Supplementary Figures
and Tables
Figure C.1: Welfare Gains from New Products and City-Level GDP Growth
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Notes: The figure plots welfare gains derived from a four-tier CES price index for the periods 2008-2010 and 2011-2014
against average annual lagged GDP growth from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Figure C.2: Welfare Gains from New Products and House Price Growth
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Notes: The figure plots welfare gains derived from a four-tier CES price index for the periods 2008-2010 and 2011-2014
against average annual lagged house price growth from the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
Table C.1: Extensive Margin Entry and Exit Patterns by Number of Initial Markets
Markets 2008 Product Enters All Product Exits All Share of
Retailer’s Markets (%) Retailer’s Markets (%) Value (%)
1 100 100 16
2-13 86 72 63
14-25 80 58 3
26 86 64 17
Notes: In the entry (exit) grid, the ‘Markets’ column is the total number of markets into (out of) which the retailer has
introduced (discontinued) the product relative to 2008. The horizontal bins reflect the number of markets into which the
product enters within one year (four quarters) of entering its first market. Percentages represent the share of average quarterly
revenue of all exiting products over the time period that falls into each bin.
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Table C.2: Extensive Margin Entry and Exit Patterns by Number of Initial Markets
Markets 2010 Product Enters All Product Exits All Share of
Retailer’s Markets (%) Retailer’s Markets (%) Value (%)
1 100 100 20
2-13 90 74 62
14-25 81 52 4
26 87 59 12
Notes: In the entry (exit) grid, the ‘Markets’ column is the total number of markets into (out of) which the retailer has
introduced (discontinued) the product relative to 2010. The horizontal bins reflect the number of markets into which the
product enters within one year (four quarters) of entering its first market. Percentages represent the share of average quarterly
revenue of all exiting products over the time period that falls into each bin.
Table C.3: Log Sales by Exporter Experience, 2008-2012, HS2 Products
(1) (2) (3)
New Exporters
Year 1 -0.267 -0.223 -0.411
(0.386) (0.443) (0.743)
Year 2 -0.0896 -0.0734 -0.247
(0.556) (0.588) (0.746)
Year 3 -0.370 -0.410 -0.596
(0.730) (0.724) (0.663)
Year 4 0.133 0.0974 -0.0872
(0.711) (0.738) (0.853)
Year 5 -0.0761 -0.100 -0.299
(0.988) (1.000) (1.008)
Experienced Exporters
Year 1 -1.445*** -1.339*** -1.494***
(0.472) (0.498) (0.424)
Year 2 -1.280 -1.202 -1.343**
(0.945) (0.951) (0.613)
Year 3 -0.829 -0.807 -0.960*
(0.887) (0.897) (0.511)
Year 4 -0.658 -0.631 -0.783
(0.966) (0.984) (0.566)
Year 5 -0.657 -0.620 -0.786**
(0.952) (0.929) (0.375)
Fixed Effects Year Year, Dest Year, Dest, HS2
Observations 161,924 161,924 161,924
R-squared 0.001 0.054 0.198
Standard errors are clustered at the firm (NIT) level. ** signifies p<0.01, * signifies p<0.05
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Table C.4: Log Sales by Exporter Experience, 2008-2012, HS6 Products
(1) (2) (3)
New Exporters
Year 1 0.494*** 0.590*** 0.430***
(0.152) (0.149) (0.150)
Year 2 1.055*** 1.119*** 0.990***
(0.161) (0.164) (0.158)
Year 3 1.340*** 1.357*** 1.205***
(0.154) (0.156) (0.153)
Year 4 1.381*** 1.402*** 1.239***
(0.155) (0.155) (0.153)
Year 5 1.282*** 1.314*** 1.136***
(0.161) (0.162) (0.159)
Experienced Exporters
Year 1 -0.235*** -0.145*** -0.199***
(0.0471) (0.0459) (0.0444)
Year 2 0.216*** 0.273*** 0.250***
(0.0463) (0.0450) (0.0433)
Year 3 0.503*** 0.513*** 0.467***
(0.0468) (0.0460) (0.0431)
Year 4 0.679*** 0.694*** 0.637***
(0.0471) (0.0459) (0.0434)
Year 5 0.638*** 0.664*** 0.591***
(0.0488) (0.0475) (0.0446)
Fixed Effects Year Year, Dest Year, Dest, HS4
Observations 269,605 269,605 269,605
R-squared 0.004 0.050 0.188
Standard errors are clustered at the firm (NIT) level. ** signifies p<0.01, * signifies p<0.05
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Table C.5: Extended Gravity Regressions
Effect on probability of exporting to a new country in group
Latin America European Union US & Canada
First Destination Group Without industry controls
Latin America 0.06*** -0.02 -0.1***
European Union -0.14*** 0.15*** 0.13**
US & Canada 0.01 0.13*** -0.21***
First Destination Group With industry controls
Latin America -0.02 0.01 -0.02
European Union -0.04 -0.09** -0.18***
US & Canada 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.40***
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296
The table reports results of regressing an indicator for entering a Latin American market,
an EU market, or either the US or Canada, conditioning on a subsample of new exporters
who do enter some foreign market. The first set of results do not condition on HS2 industry,
while the second set conditions on the modal HS2 industry exported by the firm. Asterisks
indicate coefficient significance: *** if p<0.01, ** if p<0.05, * if p<0.1.
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